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AIRSPACE AND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
TROY A. RULE
ABSTRACT
This Article argues that the United States Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence fails to account for instances when public entities restrict
private airspace solely to keep it open for their own use. Many landowners
rely on open space above adjacent land to preserve scenic views for their
properties, to provide sunlight access for their rooftop solar panels, or to
serve other uses that require no physical invasion of the neighboring space.
Private citizens typically must purchase easements or covenants to prevent
their neighbors from erecting trees or buildings that would interfere with
these non-physical airspace uses. In contrast, public entities can often secure
their non-physical uses of neighboring airspace without having to
compensate neighbors by simply imposing height restrictions or other
regulations on the space. The Court’s existing regulatory takings rules,
which focus heavily on whether a challenged government action involves
physical invasion of the claimant’s property or destroys all economically
beneficial use of the property, fail to protect private landowners against these
uncompensated takings of negative airspace easements. In recent years,
regulations aimed at keeping private airspace open for specific government
uses have threatened wind energy developments throughout the country and
have even halted major construction projects near the Las Vegas Strip. This
Article highlights several situations in which governments can impose height
restrictions or other regulations as a way to effectively take negative airspace
easements for their own benefit. This Article also describes why current
regulatory takings rules fail to adequately protect citizens against these
situations and advocates a new rule capable of filling this gap in takings law.
The new rule would clarify the Court’s takings jurisprudence as it relates to
airspace and would promote more fair and efficient allocations of airspace
rights between governments and private citizens.
 Associate Professor, University of Missouri School of Law. Many thanks to Dennis Crouch,
Wilson Freyermuth, Blake Hudson, Rhett Larson, Dale Whitman, and the faculty at Florida State
University School of Law for their insightful comments on early versions of this Article.
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INTRODUCTION
Without ever venturing into the open airspace above private land, public
entities can use that space to preserve scenic views for government buildings,
to deliver sunlight to publicly-owned solar panels, to transmit military radar
signals, or to serve other valuable functions.1 This ability for governments to
use private airspace without physically invading it has important implications
in the context of takings law. Public entities typically acquire private property
through voluntary sales or eminent domain, compensating citizens for the
acquired property. However, governments can sometimes secure their nonphysical uses of private airspace at far less expense by simply restricting the
space rather than formally taking it. Through height restrictions or other landuse controls, public entities can take the equivalent of negative airspace
easements tailored to serve their own interests. Such restrictions seek not to
govern land use conflicts among private landowners but to conscript specific
airspace into government service.
Regulations designed to keep airspace open so it can serve a nontrespassory government use typically are not compensable under existing
regulatory takings law. Governments can often impose such restrictions
without risking takings liability, even though the effective transfer of
property rights resulting from such restrictions often mirrors that of an overt
taking through eminent domain. Modern regulatory takings jurisprudence
focuses heavily on whether the challenged government action involves a
physical invasion of the claimant’s property or whether it denies the claimant
of all economically viable use of the parcel at issue. These shorthand tests,
commonly known as the Loretto and Lucas rules,2 succeed in detecting many
types of government actions that warrant the payment of just compensation

1. The protection of natural indoor lighting for public buildings and sunlight access for city-owned
urban gardens are examples of other conceivable non-physical government uses of neighboring open
airspace. Governments are increasingly recognizing the significant role that natural lighting designs can
play in energy efficiency. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R14-2-1802.B.6 (2007) (providing that “solar
daylighting,” defined as the “non-residential application of a device specifically designed to capture and
redirect the visible portion of the solar beam, while controlling the infrared portion, for use in illuminating
interior building spaces in lieu of artificial lighting[,]” constitutes a “Distributed Renewable Energy
Resource” together with renewable energy devices such as small wind turbines and passive solar energy
systems). Government-sponsored urban gardens in blighted areas of major cities have also grown in
popularity in recent years. See generally Catherine J. LaCroix, Urban Agriculture and Other Green Uses:
Remaking the Shrinking City, 42 URB. LAW. 225 (2010) (describing urban garden programs in Cleveland,
Ohio, Detroit, Michigan, and elsewhere).
2. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas v. S. Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). For a more detailed description of these two regulatory takings
rules and why they fail to adequately protect citizens against the regulatory takings of airspace easements
discussed in this Article, see infra notes 81–105 and accompanying text.

424

WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 90:421

under the Takings Clause. However, neither of these rules accounts for
instances when public entities restrict private airspace solely so that they can
exploit it in ways that require no physical invasion. Landowners whose
properties are subjected to such restrictions are thus left to argue their claims
under the nebulous test set forth in Penn Central,3 with slim chances of
success. The legitimate police power restrictions of airspace upheld in Penn
Central are materially different from the abuses of regulatory authority aimed
at enhancing a public entity’s own resource position that are described in this
Article.4 Unfortunately, most courts have heretofore been unable or unwilling
to recognize this distinction when adjudicating takings claims over airspace.5
The imprecision of the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence relating to
airspace rights is increasingly problematic in this era of unprecedented
competition for airspace. Airspace is a critical resource for renewable energy
and sustainable development. Commercial wind turbines must extend
hundreds of feet into rural skies to be fully productive.6 Solar panels require
vast amounts of open airspace to access direct sunlight.7 And vertical
development that extends high into urban airspace is a significant strategy for
combating suburban sprawl.8 As airspace grows ever more important in the
coming years, conflicts between private citizens and governments over it will
likely grow as well. Regulatory takings law in its present form is ill-equipped
to fairly and efficiently govern these conflicts.
This Article draws attention to “veiled airspace easement regulations”—
government-imposed restrictions that transfer the practical equivalent of
negative airspace easements to public entities. Arguing that such regulations
are exactly the sorts of government actions that the Takings Clause was
intended to protect against, this Article advocates treating these regulations as

3. See Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
4. For detailed examples of such exploitative uses of airspace restrictions, see generally infra text
accompanying notes 41–68 (describing the potential for government entities to impose height restrictions
to protect military radar, create buffers near airports, prevent the shading of municipal solar energy
systems, or preserve scenic views for government buildings).
5. For a detailed discussion of Penn Central, how its facts are materially distinguishable from the
situations that are the focus of this Article, and some possible reasons why the Penn Central test fails to
adequately protect landowners in these contexts, see infra text accompanying notes 100–16 and 154–65.
6. Most commercial wind turbines are well over 300 feet high. See AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N,
WIND ENERGY TEACHER’S GUIDE 4 (2003), http://www.ocgi.okstate.edu/owpi/EducOutreach/
Documents/AWEATeachersGuide.pdf (noting that modern “utlity-scale [wind] turbines can be 100 meters
(over 300 feet) high or more”).
7. For a primer on legal issues relating to solar access, see generally Sara C. Bronin, Solar Rights,
89 B.U. L. REV. 1217 (2009); Troy A. Rule, Shadows on the Cathedral: Solar Access Laws in a Different
Light, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 851 (2010).
8. Vertical development can be an effective means of increasing urban densities, and greater urban
density is often viewed as promoting sustainability. See, e.g., MIKE DAVIS, PLANET OF SLUMS 134 (2006)
(noting that “urban density can translate into great efficiencies in land, energy, and resource use”).
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compensable takings. Part I of this Article highlights courts’ longtime
recognition of airspace rights as constitutionally protected property, including
such recognition within the parallel context of eminent domain proceedings.
Part II describes four specific examples of situations in which governments
can abuse their regulatory power to effectively acquire valuable interests in
private airspace and explains how the unique attributes of airspace have led
courts to overlook these scenarios in their takings jurisprudence. Part III
suggests that the Supreme Court should consider adopting an additional,
supplemental takings rule that requires just compensation to landowners
when regulations (i) deprive them of possessory interests in airspace (ii) for
the primary purpose of securing the government’s own exploitation of that
space. Part III also discusses principles set forth in previous writings by
Professors Joseph Sax and Jed Rubenfeld that could assist courts in
distinguishing ordinary police power regulations of airspace from regulations
involving such direct government exploitation of the restricted space that just
compensation would be warranted under the proposed rule. Part IV argues
that this new takings rule would add sorely-needed clarity to an ambiguous
area of regulatory takings law and would promote more just and efficient
allocations of airspace rights between public entities and private landowners.
I. AIRSPACE RIGHTS AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
Airspace, the layer of open space that blankets the earth’s surface, is a
complex and oft-forgotten natural resource. Airspace is as immovable and
unique as land but differs in that it is also totally invisible and intangible.9
Given airspace’s peculiar attributes, it is unsurprising that courts and legal
scholars have long struggled to formulate rules to govern its use.10
For centuries, neighbors have quarreled over conflicting uses of the
airspace above their land.11 Common law doctrines and statutory rules have

9. For a more detailed discussion of the distinct character of airspace as a natural resource, see Troy
A. Rule, Airspace in a Green Economy, 59 UCLA L. REV. 270, 274–77 (2011).
10. For an excellent historical summary of the painstaking struggle to develop laws in the United
States governing airspace rights, see generally STUART BANNER, WHO OWNS THE SKY?: THE STRUGGLE
TO CONTROL AIRSPACE FROM THE WRIGHT BROTHERS ON (2008). Other commentators have also
remarked on the difficulties and uncertainty associated with airspace rights laws. See, e.g., Colin Cahoon,
Low Altitude Airspace: A Property Rights No-Man’s Land, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 157, 191 (1990) (noting
that decades after the advent of modern flight, “courts have yet to adopt a uniform theory of airspace
property ownership”); Mary B. Spector, Vertical and Horizontal Aspects of Takings Jurisprudence: Is
Airspace Property?, 7 CARDOZO L. REV. 489, 502 (1985) (noting that the “characterization and
apportionment of rights in airspace became more complicated with the advent of commercial air travel”).
11. See generally Eugene J. Morris, Air Rights are “Fertile Soil”, 1 URB. LAW. 247, 253–56 (1969)
(describing numerous airspace-related legal disputes adjudicated in the nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries).
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gradually evolved to address many of these conflicts among private
landowners.12 However, as the function of government has expanded over
time,13 public entities have increasingly made uses of airspace as well. When
a government’s use of private airspace clashes with a landowner’s use of the
space, perplexing legal questions can arise. Should the airspace rights in
dispute receive the same property protections commonly afforded to surface
land? And under what conditions should the law permit public entities to
confiscate or interfere with those rights?
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment is the obvious launching
point for analyzing conflicts between governments and citizens over private
airspace. Its brief language prohibits governments from taking “private
property . . . for public use, without just compensation.”14 A threshold
question that arises out of this language is whether the assets at issue in any
regulatory taking case are legally cognizable “property” at all.15 As the
following parts show, longstanding case law and more than 70 years of
compensated takings of airspace easements through eminent domain are
evidence that airspace rights are indeed “property” under the Takings
Clause.16
A. Airspace Rights under Common Law
Landowners have long held common law property rights in the lowaltitude airspace above their parcels.17 The origins of modern airspace law
date as far back as the 1300s, when the Italian jurist Cino da Pistoia wrote,

12. A discussion of the ad coelum doctrine at common law as it relates to airspace and of modern
legislation aimed at addressing various airspace use conflicts arising from modern flight follows in Part
I.A of this Article. See infra text accompanying notes 18–26.
13. Statistics on the growth of government spending as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) evidence the substantial increase in government activities over the past century. See, e.g., ROBERT
C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 616 (2005) (noting that United States government
spending increased from 10 percent of GDP in 1929 to 32.4 percent of GDP in 2003).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V. Although the Fifth Amendment initially applied only to the federal
government, courts have long interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as making the Fifth Amendment
applicable to state and local government as well. See STEVEN J. EAGLE, REGULATORY TAKINGS 4 (4th ed.
2009) (“Since 1897, the Supreme Court has interpreted the Takings Clause as applying to states and
localities as well.”).
15. The Supreme Court has made clear that the Takings Clause “only protects property rights as they
are established under state law, not as they might have been established or ought to have been established.”
Stop the Beach Renourishment, Inc. v. Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2612 (2010).
16. See infra text accompanying notes 37–39.
17. The author recently published an article featuring a more detailed discussion of the nature of
airspace and of the history of airspace rights. See Rule, supra note 9. Some of the background material in
this part draws from that earlier article.
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“Cuius est solum, eius est usque ad coelum,”18 or “[to] whomsoever the soil
belongs, he owns also to the sky.”19 This simple “ad coelum doctrine”
distributes airspace rights based on ownership of the surface land situated
immediately below the space. The doctrine appeared in Coke’s
commentaries20 and in Blackstone’s commentaries,21 securing its place within
English and American common law.22 By the early 1900s, courts in the
United States were applying it to find trespass for even minor intrusions into
neighboring airspace.23
The United States Congress and the courts clarified the scope of
landowners’ airspace rights in the early twentieth century when airplanes
began taking to the skies.24 Federal legislation enacted during that period
carefully defined “navigable airspace,” which generally encompasses all
space situated more than 500 feet above the ground,25 and designated that
space as a nationally-shared common area for modern flight.26 Although the
Supreme Court acknowledged navigable airspace legislation in United States
v. Causby in 1946, characterizing navigable airspace as a “public highway”
for air travel,27 the Court emphasized that landowners still held property

18. Stuart S. Ball, The Vertical Extent of Ownership in Land, 76 U. PA. L. REV. 631 (1928)
(attributing the phrase to Cino da Pistoia).
19. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 453 (4th ed. 1968). The full maxim reads, “cujus est solum, ejus est
usque ad coelum et ad inferos.” Id.
20. See, e.g., EDWARD COKE, COMMENTARIES ON LITTLETON, § 4a (1670).
21. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, 2 COMMENTARIES 8 (1836).
22. See ROBERT R. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF AIRSPACE 34 (1968) (“The usque ad coelum maxim, as we
have seen, was in large measure a child of Coke, as far as its incorporation into English law was
concerned.”); id. at 35 (“Blackstone’s Commentaries . . . reiterated Coke’s viewpoint on ownership of
airspace. These Commentaries burst upon the scene practically on the eve of American independence, and
were accepted as ‘quasi authority’ in America.”) (internal citations omitted).
23. See, e.g., John Cobb Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum in International Air
Law, 1 MCGILL L.J. 23, 60 (1952) (citing Hannabalson v. Sessions, 90 N.W. 93, 94 (Iowa 1902) (holding
that reaching an arm across a property was a trespass because “[i]t is one of the oldest rules of property . . .
that the title of the owner of the soil extends . . . upward usque ad coelum”)); see also Butler v. Frontier
Tel. Co., 79 N.E. 716 (N.Y. 1906) (finding an action for ejectment in connection with telephone wires
strung above the plaintiff’s land).
24. For a discussion of the discourse among courts and commentators regarding how to reconcile
common law airspace rules with modern aviation, see generally BANNER, supra note 10, at 85–100. See
also Rule, supra note 9, at 280–82; Marc R. Poirier, The Virtue of Vagueness in Takings Doctrine, 24
CARDOZO L. REV. 93, 178 (2002) (noting that “[a]irplane overflight provides an example where a
technological advance that blossomed into widespread social use spawned a new type of property use
conflict” and that, “in the early decades of this new resource use conflict, theories blossomed on how to
characterize and resolve the dispute”) (citation omitted).
25. The most current legislation relating to navigable airspace is the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.
See 49 U.S.C.A. § 40103(a)–(b) (West 2012) (providing that United States citizens have a “public right of
transit through the navigable airspace” and authorizing the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration to develop regulations more clearly defining what constitutes navigable airspace).
26. See 14 C.F.R. § 77 (2010).
27. See United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 264 (1946).
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interests in the non-navigable airspace above their parcels. In the Court’s
words, a “landowner owns at least as much of the space above the ground as
he can occupy or use in connection with the land[,]” and the “fact that he
does not occupy it in a physical sense—by the erection of buildings and the
like—is not material” to determining the scope of ownership.28 In the decades
since Causby, courts’ frequent recognition of private airspace rights in the
context of view easements,29 condominium laws,30 and solar access
easements31 has left little doubt that rights in non-navigable airspace are a
legitimate form of property and that sub-adjacent landowners inherently
possess those rights.32
B. Airspace Rights in Eminent Domain Proceedings
Courts’ unwavering treatment of airspace rights as property under eminent
domain law is further evidence that landowners hold property interests in the
non-navigable airspace above their land. Eminent domain authority enables
public entities to acquire private property for public use when they are unable
to obtain it through a voluntary sale.33 When appropriately exercised,34 the
eminent domain power deters landowners whose properties are needed for a

28. Id. at 264 (citing Hinman v. Pac. Air Lines Trans. Corp., 84 F.2d 755 (9th Cir. 1936)).
29. See, e.g., Schwartz v. Murphy, 812 A.2d 87 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) (enforcing a view easement
contained in a deed); Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing the Goal through
Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 401, 407 n.31 (1992) (citing Andrew
Dana & Michael Ramsey, Conservation Easements and the Common Law, 8 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 2, 13
(1989)) (noting that “[m]odern courts have . . . recognized ‘view easements’”).
30. For a recent discussion of airspace rights in the condominium context, see generally Douglas C.
Harris, Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 694,
700–01 (2011) (describing the three-dimensional parceling of airspace in urban areas and emergence of
condominium law in the United States and in Vancouver, British Columbia), and Bronin, supra note 7, at
1250 (describing how the “scarcity of land and the proliferation of dense, high-rise condominium buildings
gave rise to horizontal airspace as a unit of real property—a concept in property law, which had not existed
before the advent of skyscrapers”).
31. Numerous states have enacted statutes expressly recognizing solar access easements as valid and
enforceable real property interests. For a list of these state-level solar access statutes as of 2008, see Tawny
L. Alvarez, Don’t Take My Sunshine Away: Right-to-Light and Solar Energy in the Twenty-First Century,
28 PACE L. REV. 535, 547–48 n.90 (2008).
32. Even some state statutes expressly recognize the rights of landowners in the airspace above their
parcels. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 493.040 (1923) (providing that the “ownership of the space above the
lands and waters of this state is declared to be vested in the several owners of the surface beneath, subject
to the right of flight . . . .”).
33. For a survey of background principles and recurring issues in eminent domain law, see generally
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN (1985).
34. Much of the scholarly and popular criticism of the eminent domain power in recent years has
related to the scope of “public use” under the Takings Clause in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision
in Kelo v. New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469 (2005). For a primer on these issues, see generally William
Woodyard & Glenn Boggs, Public Outcry: Kelo v. City of New London—A Proposed Solution, 39 ENVTL.
L. 431, 431–43 (2009) (describing Kelo and its aftermath).
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public use from “holding out” for excessively high sale prices and thereby
impeding worthwhile public projects.35 Eminent domain proceedings
typically conclude with a private party’s formal conveyance of a property
interest to a government party, who pays some agreed-upon or courtdetermined amount of “just compensation” in return.36
Public agencies routinely pay just compensation to acquire airspace
interests through eminent domain, engaging in essentially the same process
they use to take interests in surface land. For instance, governments have
been condemning airspace easements near airports for flight paths since
shortly after the advent of modern aviation. Most airplanes require lengthy
stretches of low-altitude airspace for takeoffs and landings, so takings of
airspace easements through eminent domain often accompany airport
construction and expansion projects.37 Provisions expressly authorizing such
takings of airspace easements upon payment of just compensation were
included within the Uniform Airports Act of 1935,38 and legislatures in
twelve states had enacted laws authorizing the practice by 1941.39
Governments also occasionally use eminent domain to condemn easements
for scenic views.40 This long history of airspace easement condemnations is
further evidence that airspace rights are legally protected property under the
Takings Clause.

35. Commentators have long cited eminent domain authority as a means of helping public entities to
overcome “holdout problems” in connection with land assemblies for roads and other public projects. See,
e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124–25 (2004) (describing how
eminent domain can assist in overcoming holdout problems); Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 75 (1986) (framing eminent domain as a means of mitigating holdout
problems in public projects that require the assembly of multiple privately-held parcels).
36. See SHAVELL, supra note 35, at 182–215 (providing a thorough analysis of issues associated with
the “just compensation” requirement and distinguishing between explicit compensation and in-kind
compensation).
37. See J. Scott Hamilton, Allocation of Airspace as a Scarce Natural Resource, 22 TRANSP. L.J.
251, 267 (1994) (noting that the “state or local government developing a public airport may use its power
of eminent domain to condemn and purchase both land and aviation easements over land in the vicinity of
the airport”) (citation omitted). Specific instances abound of the use of eminent domain to take airspace
rights near airports. See, e.g., Emily Donohue, Tree Stands in Flight Path, THE TROY RECORD (Jan. 14,
2010), http://www.troyrecord.com/articles/2010/01/14/news/doc4b4e8784683f0540 834863.txt (describing
a county’s plan to take airspace near a municipal airport to prevent interference from a tall tree).
38. See Warner Brock, Constitutionality of a Zoning Regulation Requiring Landowners Abutting on
an Airport Not to Build Beyond a Certain Height without Compensation, 23 TEX. L. REV. 57, 64 (1944)
(noting that the “Uniform Airports Act of 1935 gives authority to acquire airspace rights by eminent
domain”) (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 64 n.49 (citing John M. Hunter, Jr. & Lewis H. Ulman, Airport Legal Developments of
Interest to Municipalities—1941, 13 J. AIR L. & COM. 116, 137 (1942)).
40. See Gideon Kanner, Making Laws and Sausages: A Quarter-Century Retrospective on Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 679, 777 (2005) (citing
Kamrowski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1966)) (noting that “passive easements (such as sight
easements for highways, or scenic view easements) are condemned regularly”).
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II. VEILED AIRSPACE EASEMENTS AND REGULATORY TAKINGS LAW
Although airspace rights generally enjoy robust protection under property
law and within eminent domain proceedings, they are far less respected in the
context of regulatory takings claims. This disparate treatment of airspace
rights exists in part because modern regulatory takings laws fail to
acknowledge that governments can appropriate and even exploit airspace for
their own benefit without ever physically invading it. Overlooking the
distinctive attributes of airspace, existing regulatory takings rules
inadequately protect private citizens against restrictions that effectively take
negative easements across their airspace to benefit government entities.41
Below are four examples of situations when these “veiled airspace easement
regulations” have arisen or could arise and a discussion of why such
regulations often are not compensable under existing takings law.
A. Examples of Veiled Airspace Easement Regulations
1. Restricting Wind Farms to Protect Military Radar
Regulations aimed at protecting the United States Armed Forces’ use of
private airspace have significantly hindered wind energy development in
recent years. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) regulations allow the
Department of Defense (DOD) to challenge proposed commercial wind
turbine installations that they believe could interfere with military radar.42
The FAA has enforced these regulations against wind farm developers,43 even
when the commercial turbines targeted are well within landowners’ privately-

41. At least one other commentator has argued that airspace rights receive inadequate protection
under current law. See EAGLE, supra note 76, at 943 (arguing that there is “no substantial reason why
property interests such as those involving upper-floor condominiums” or “air rights” should be excluded
from stronger takings protections than exist under current law).
42. The DOD published a detailed study in 2006 determining that commercial-scale wind turbines
can interfere with existing military radar systems. See generally OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF DEF, RESEARCH &
ENG’G, REPORT TO THE CONGRESSIONAL DEFENSE COMMITTEES: THE EFFECT OF WINDMILL FARMS ON
MILITARY READINESS, 52 (2006), available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/ pdfs/WindFarmReport.pdf
(concluding that “[w]ind turbines are physically large structures that will block the transmission of radar
waves,” and that “[m]ultiple turbines located in proximity of each other will also cause diffraction of radar
waves”). The same study notes that the FAA “has the responsibility to promote and maintain the safe and
efficient use of U.S. airspace for all users” and that the DOD “stands prepared to assist and support the
FAA in any efforts the FAA may decide to undertake in that regard.” Id. at 4.
43. See Donald Zillman et al., More Than Tilting At Windmills, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 1, 17–18 n.117
(2009) (noting that the DOD’s “Interim Policy on Proposed Windmill Farm Locations” instructed DOD
officials to “contest any establishment of windmill farms ‘within radar line of site of the National Air
Defense and Homeland Security Radars’”) (citation omitted).
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held non-navigable airspace,44 and even when the proposed turbines would be
sited dozens of miles away from any military base.45 According to the
American Wind Energy Association, almost as much wind energy generating
capacity as was actually built in the United States in 2009 was “abandoned or
delayed because of radar concerns raised by the military and the [FAA].”46
The FAA’s highly-publicized delay of a $2 billion wind energy project in
Oregon in 2010 showcased how threatening these military radar-focused
restrictions have been to the wind energy industry.47 In many cases, the DOD
could have avoided these conflicts with wind energy developers by installing
relatively inexpensive upgrades to its aging radar systems.48
Wind energy is an increasingly integral part of the United States’ longterm energy strategy. Wind energy generation helps to reduce the nation’s
reliance on fossil fuels, improves trade balances, and provides greater
economic stability.49 State and federal laws aimed at encouraging renewable
energy have helped to drive a significant increase in demand for wind energy
over the past decade.50 Even in the face of the FAA regulations just described
44. 1.5-megawatt commercial wind turbines typically have blade “tip heights” of less than 400 feet.
Even the largest onshore wind turbines with any significant presence on the U.S. market have tip heights
of less than 500 feet. See, e.g., SIVA CHOCKALINGAM, GE ENERGY, GE WIND: WIND ENERGY BASICS 3
(2009), available at http://www.ge-energy.com/content/multimedia/_files/downloads/wind_energy_basics
.pdf (noting that the tip height of a General Electric 1.5 MW wind turbine is roughly 394 feet and that
“taller wind turbines with taller towers or longer blades may stand as hight as 150 m (492 feet) from
ground level”).
45. See Kate Galbraith, Gulf Coast Wind Farms Spring Up, as Do Worries, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/11/us/11ttwind.html# (suggesting that the “Navy would like wind
farm construction to stay outside a 30-mile radius of its facilities”); see also Zillman, supra note 43, at 19
(stating that, in 2006, the FAA, at the request of the DOD, “began issuing notices of ‘presumed hazard’ to
wind project contractors . . . for sites within 60 nautical miles of long-range radar installations”); see also
infra note 52 and accompanying text.
46. Leora Broydo Vestel, On the Radar, and That’s the Problem, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 2010, at B1.
47. See Juliet Eilperin, Pentagon Objections Hold Up Oregon Wind Farm, WASH. POST, Apr. 15,
2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/15/AR2010041503120.html (describing
how a developer had “planned to break ground” in two weeks time on a “845-megawatt, $2 billion” wind
farm in Oregon, but was delayed when “Pentagon officials moved to deny the developer its final [FAA]
permit”).
48. For a discussion of the potential for relatively inexpensive upgrades to military radar systems to
address interference concerns, see infra notes 186–87 and accompanying text.
49. The United States Department of Energy cited several of the advantages of wind energy in an
executive summary of a 2008 study regarding how to best increase wind energy’s share of the United
States energy portfolio. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, 20% WIND ENERGY BY 2030: INCREASING WIND
ENERGY’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE U.S. ENERGY SUPPLY 13 (2008), available at http://www1.eere
.energy.gov/windandhydro/pdfs/42864.pdf (describing such wind energy benefits as avoidance of
greenhouse gas emissions and other adverse impacts of fossil fuel-generated electric energy, conserved
water supplies, national energy security, new income for rural communities and landowners, and new
jobs).
50. For a table summary of federal, state and local renewable energy incentives, see Financial
Incentives for Renewable Energy, DATABASE OF STATE INCENTIVES FOR RENEWABLES & EFFICIENCY,
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and persistent turmoil in the national economy, wind energy development
accounted for more than 35% of all new electric generating capacity added in
the United States between 2007 and 2011, exceeding the new capacity of
nuclear and coal systems combined.51
In regions that are ideally suited for commercial-scale wind energy
projects, an FAA objection that ultimately thwarts a wind farm project can
deprive a single rural landowner of hundreds of thousands of dollars of
potential income under a wind energy lease.52 When the FAA impedes or
halts a wind energy project solely to keep private airspace open for military
use, it is effectively using its regulatory power to take airspace easements for
the DOD without just compensation.
2. Imposing Height Restrictions to Create Buffers near Airports
Airport development is another context in which veiled takings of airspace
easements arise. Public airport construction and expansion projects inherently
involve government acquisitions of real property. If a project requires
additional, privately-owned surface land to extend a runway, the public entity
engaged in the project generally must exercise its eminent domain power and
pay just compensation to the owner to obtain the land.53 Governments also
typically purchase avigation easements54 for the airport’s low-altitude glide
paths for takeoffs and landings.55 However, existing case law is less clear

http://www.dsireusa.org/summarytables/finre.cfm (last visited Nov. 15, 2012).
51. Industry Statistics, Am, Wind Energy Ass’n, http://www.awea.org/learnabout/industry_stats/
index.cfm (last updated Oct. 18, 2012).
52. A North Dakota University report from 2009 stated that landowners under commercial wind
energy lease agreements typically receive between $4000 and $6000 per year per megawatt of generating
capacity. See DWIGHT AAKRE & RON HAUGEN, WIND TURBINE LEASE CONSIDERATIONS FOR
LANDOWNERS 3 (Feb. 2009), available at http://www.ag.ndsu.edu/pubs/agecon/market/ec1394 .pdf. A
single modern commercial wind turbine often has a generating capacity of between one to three
wegawatts, and commercial wind leases usually have durational terms of 20 to 50 years. Vicki Harding,
Wind Farm Leases: Some Basics, 35 MICH. REAL PROP. REV. 168, 169–71 (2008).
53. The general legitimacy of the use of eminent domain power to assemble land for airport runways
is well settled. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Heller’s Gridlock Economy in Perspective: Why there is Too
Little, Not Too Much Private Property, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 51, 73 (2011) (stating that “no one disputes that
airports and runways often require use of the eminent domain power for land assembly”).
54. Avigation easements are easements to “allow aircraft to fly through a given airspace.” Cnty. of
Westchester v. Town of Greenwich, Conn., 793 F. Supp. 1195, 1204 (S.D.N.Y. 1992), rev’d sub. nom.
Cnty. of Westchester, N.Y. v. Comm’r of Transp. of State of Conn., 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 37–39. It is worth noting that, although takings of avigation
easements for flight paths near airports often involve the payment of just compensation, the FAA has
challenged wind turbines near airports on some occasions without offering compensation to landowners.
See, e.g., Katheleen Conti, Losing Altitude: With the airport nearby, Winthrop’s high hopes for a wind
turbine, revenue are sinking toward disappointment, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 26, 2009, at 1 (describing
the FAA’s objections to multiple commercial wind turbine installation proposals in Winthrop,
Massachusetts, due to concerns about impacts on takeoffs and landings at Logan International Airport and
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regarding whether municipalities must compensate landowners in connection
with height restrictions imposed to create airspace buffer areas adjacent to
those flight paths.56 Although airplanes may not regularly traverse these
areas, airports must keep them open as a precaution against instances when
planes veer outside of flight paths due to weather, aircraft malfunctions, or
other unpredictable factors.57
Multiple lawsuits arose recently when Clark County, Nevada, imposed
new height restrictions to accommodate expanded runways at the McCarran
International Airport.58 The airport is situated close to the Las Vegas Strip—
an area renowned for its glitzy hotel towers and casinos.59 Clark County’s
new “transition zone” height restrictions were specifically tailored to convert
airspace above several private parcels near the airport into flight path buffer
areas.60 The restrictions severely limited the development potential of the
burdened properties near the Strip, diminishing property values and imposing
substantial financial losses on landowners.61
Ordinances like those challenged in Clark County that restrict building
heights so that private airspace can serve a specific airport function are
effectively veiled takings of airspace easements. The economic value
transferred from landowners to the government is essentially the same
regardless of whether a public entity restricts airspace for a regular aircraft
flight path or merely for a buffer or transition zone. Restrictions imposed for
either purpose prohibit citizens from occupying their airspace solely so that
the government can exploit the space without paying for it.
describing one resident’s belief that “if the FAA is preventing the town from acquiring wind power, then it
should compensate the town”).
56. A more detailed discussion of the ongoing debate in the common law over whether restrictions
for airport buffer zones trigger regulatory takings liability follows in Part IV.B below. See infra text
accompanying notes 190–202.
57. See, e.g., Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Hsu v. Cnty. of Clark, 2005 WL 689492 (Nev.
2005) (No. 04-1282) [Hereinafter Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu] (describing the “‘transition’ zone” at
issue in that case as “an area adjacent to the runway for pilots to use when they are unable to confine the
flight of their aircraft within the approach/departure zone acquired by [the County] for the airport and stray
off to the side”).
58. See, e.g., id.; McCarran Int’l Airport v. Sisolak, 137 P.3d (Nev. 2006); Vacation Vill., Inc. v.
Clark Cnty., Nev., 497 F.3d 902 (2007).
59. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu, supra note 57, at 6 (describing the area of one takings
claimant’s property as within “what would be considered a ‘high rent’ district, being near the famous Las
Vegas Strip, and in close proximity to the Luxor, Mandalay Bay, Monte Carlo, Bellagio, Alladdin, and
Balley’s casino/resorts”).
60. Deposition testimony quoted in an unpublished opinion relating to this dispute suggests that the
transition zones at issue were designed to give aircraft “some maneuvering room down close to the
runway”. See Cnty. of Clark v. Hsu, 2004 WL 5046209 at 5 (Nev. 2004).
61. A claimant’s attorney in one of the Las Vegas airport cases characterized the county’s imposition
of the height restrictions as a “naked attempt to have unrelated neighbors shoulder part of the financial
burden of operating [the] public airport.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu, supra note 57, at 1–2.
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3. Imposing Height Restrictions to Prevent the Shading of Municipal
Solar Energy Installations
Veiled takings of airspace easements could eventually arise in connection
with municipal solar energy installations as well. In recent years, local
governments have increasingly installed photovoltaic solar panels and other
solar energy systems on publicly owned buildings.62 Most solar energy
devices need direct sunlight access to be fully productive, and protecting such
access often requires that some airspace above neighboring property be kept
clear of trees or buildings to prevent shading.63 As government-owned solar
energy systems become ever more prevalent, some municipalities could seek
to secure solar access protection for their systems through new height
restrictions tailored to that purpose.64 Although no widely publicized
instances of this type of veiled taking of a solar access easement have
surfaced yet,65 the persistent growth of municipally-owned solar energy
systems suggests that such regulations could appear in the coming years.66

62. Examples of this growing practice abound. See, e.g., Cesar Neyoy, Somerton Council OKs Solar
Panels, YUMA SUN, July 29, 2011, http://www.yumasun.com/articles/city-71794-solar-ener gy.html
(reporting on the Somerton, Arizona, City Council’s approval of a bond issue for solar panels to “provide
electricity for the city's public safety building and its senior center”); Rich Lord, City Installing Solar
Panels on Public Works Building, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE, May 5, 2010, http://old.post-gazette
.com/pg/10125/1055569-53.stm (describing new solar panel installations on a Pittsburgh Public Works
Department building and plans for several other city-owned solar energy systems); Justin A. Rice, MBTA
May Go for Solar, THE BOSTON GLOBE (July 24, 2011), http://www.boston.com/news/local/
massachusetts/articles/2011/07/24/mbta_may_go_for_solar/ (noting plans for the Massachusetts Bay
Transit Authority to install solar panels on rooftops of multiple buildings within its transit system).
63. For an informative article on the substantial impact of shading on solar panel productivity, see
Ralf J. Muenster, Shade Happens, RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.re
newableenergyworld.com/rea/news/article/2009/02/shade-happens-54551 (stating that even a “10%
shading of a solar array can lead to a 50% decline in efficiency and even, on occasion, total system
shutdown”).
64. Although a handful of state and local jurisdictions have laws that prohibit neighbors from
growing trees or buildings that shade nearby solar panels, a greater proportion of states have statutes
authorizing citizens to privately negotiate with neighbors for solar access easements. See supra note 31.
65. Government-owned solar energy installations are still relatively uncommon, so it is not surprising
that height restrictions aimed at securing sunlight access for government solar energy systems have yet to
surface. However, public entities have imposed height restrictions in the past to secure other types of
government uses of private airspace. At least one state court case, decided long before the Supreme Court
embraced its current set of regulatory takings rules, held that a height restriction specifically designed to
benefit a government property amounted to a compensable taking. See Piper v. Ekern, 194 N.W. 159, 163
(Wis. 1923) (finding that a zoning height restriction near the Wisconsin state capitol building aimed at
protecting the building from fire required exercise of eminent domain power because it was “not designed
to promote the public welfare of the private owners of property abutting upon the Capitol Square” but was
“solely based upon a selfish motive, and is confined to the protection, from fire, of the state’s property”).
66. For the author’s own summary of the recent growth in solar energy development, see Rule, supra
note 7, at 854–56 (noting, among other things, that “[t]he generating capacity of photovoltaic (“PV”) solar
collector installations installed in the US in 2008 was triple the amount installed in 2005 and more than ten
times the amount installed in 2000”).
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A hypothetical example helps to illustrate this potential type of veiled
airspace easement regulation. Suppose that the fictional city of Suntown had
plans to install rooftop solar panels on its two-story city hall in a downtown
area that had long been subject to a 120-foot height restriction. Although no
existing buildings were tall enough to shade the city’s new solar panel array,
city officials worried that buildings constructed in the area in future years
might shade the panels and dramatically reduce their productivity. Suntown
considered protecting against future shading by acquiring solar access
easements from nearby landowners through voluntary purchases or eminent
domain.67 However, the city ultimately determined that it could obtain the
same solar access protection at far less expense by tightening the area’s
height restriction instead. The city thus amended its zoning ordinance to limit
building heights on two blocks located immediately south of city hall to just
60 feet instead of 120 feet.
Suntown’s new height restriction ordinance would effectively create solar
access easements in favor of the city. The ordinance would prohibit
landowners from occupying their airspace solely so that the city could use the
space to provide sunlight access for its solar panels.
4. Using Height Restrictions to Preserve Scenic Views for Government
Buildings
Municipalities could conceivably even impose land use restrictions as a
means of securing view easements for government properties. Scenic views
can substantially bolster a property’s value.68 Countless private landowners
have thus protected valuable views on their properties by purchasing
easements or covenants that prevent neighbors from building structures or
growing trees that would impair the views. Of course, municipalities also
hold title to land, and occasionally they too have an interest in preserving
scenic views for their own parcels. Armed with regulatory authority,

67. For a general discussion of solar access easements as a means of securing sunlight access for
solar energy installations and for a list of state statutes recognizing the validity of such easements, see
generally Bronin, supra note 7, at 1228–29.
68. Multiple empirical studies have confirmed that attractive scenic views tend to have positive
effects on market prices for real estate. See, e.g., Michael T. Bond et al., Residential Real Estate Prices: A
Room with a View, 23 J. REAL EST. RES. 129, 135 (2002) (summarizing a study of 1999 tax assessment
values of 1,172 lakefront and adjacent properties in Cuyahoga County, Ohio, that concluded that, “after
controlling for significant home characteristics, the premium added to homes with a view [of Lake Erie]
equals $256,544.72”); C.Y. Jim & Wendy Y. Chen, Value of Scenic Views: Hedonic Assessment of Private
Housing in Hong Kong, 91 LANDSCAPE & URB. PLANNING 226 (2009) (describing use of hedonic pricing
model to analyze effects of mountain and harbor views on housing values in Hong Kong and determining
that a “broad harbor view could increase the value of an apartment by 2.97%, equivalent to . . .
[$]15,173”).
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municipal governments could potentially impose height restrictions as a
means of protecting scenic views on their properties without having to
compensate neighbors.69
A fact pattern similar to that described for Suntown above illustrates how
veiled takings of airspace easements could arise in the view easement
context. Suppose that the hypothetical city of Beachville planned to erect a
new government building with large windows specifically designed to
showcase picturesque views of a nearby ocean beach. City officials feared
that owners of private parcels situated between the building and the beach
could eventually build structures that blocked the building’s views. Rather
than purchasing view easements from the owners through eminent domain,70
Beachville decided to secure view protections less expensively by imposing
new height restrictions in the area that were tailored to prohibit any new
structures from blocking the city building’s views. Like Suntown’s solar
access-driven height restrictions, such laws would transfer the equivalent of
negative airspace easement rights to Beachville without any exercise of
eminent domain authority or payment of just compensation.
B. Analysis of Veiled Airspace Easement Regulations under Existing
Takings Law
When regulations like those described above effectively transfer private
property interests to governments, citizens often turn to the law of regulatory
takings for a remedy.71 Regulatory takings law “aims to identify regulatory
actions that are functionally equivalent to the classic taking.”72 Its rules are

69. In at least one published case, a claimant has argued that a land use regulation was a disguised
attempt to impose a view easement on private property near an attractive beachfront. However, it is not
clear from the case’s opinion whether the alleged view easements would have benefited public property or
private property. See Connor v. City of Seattle, 223 P.3d 1201, 1204, 1213–14 (Wash. Ct. App. 2009)
(describing the regulated property as comprising a “gently sloping hill overlooking Puget Sound” and
dismissing for a lack of evidence the claimant’s argument that the Seattle Landmarks Preservation Board
was “seeking to impose a view easement” by enforcing the city’s Landmarks Preservation Ordinance
against portions of the property).
70. Cities can, and sometimes do, acquire view easements through eminent domain. See Kanner,
supra note 40, at 777 (citing Kamrowski v. State, 142 N.W.2d 793 (Wis. 1966)) (noting that “passive
easements (such as sight easements for highways, or scenic view easements) are condemned regularly”).
71. A student note published more than 25 years ago sought to address taking issues associated with
airspace. See generally Spector, supra note 10. However, the note offered only limited analysis of these
issues and proposed a very different approach to addressing them. Id. at 516 (suggesting that “where a
height restriction or other government action has the effect of limiting a landowner’s ability to make use of
his airspace, courts should ask whether extrajudicial factors created any reasonable preexisting
expectations with respect to that airspace” and should decide whether to award compensation based
primarily on “whether the government action altered those expectations”).
72. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
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intended to prevent public entities from using their regulatory power to
“acquire rights in private property which [they] may only acquire by purchase
or by the exercise of . . . eminent domain.”73
Modern regulatory takings law traces its beginnings to the 1922 Supreme
Court case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon.74 Justice Oliver Wendell
Holmes famously declared in his majority opinion in Mahon that, “while
property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will
be recognized as a taking.”75 In the 89 years since Mahon, the Court has
repeatedly grappled with the question of how far is “too far” in the context of
a regulatory takings claim. The Court’s much-maligned jurisprudence of this
question76 is presently distillable into a set of three general categories of
compensable regulatory takings that are familiar to practitioners and scholars
in land use law.77 Two of the three categories, labeled per se takings, involve
relatively straightforward rules that can greatly simplify the adjudication of
claims within their scope.78 The third category of regulatory takings involves
a cumbersome multi-factor, ad hoc test aimed at identifying those
government actions that are functionally equivalent to classic takings but that
73. Yara Eng’g Corp. v. City of Newark, 40 A.2d 559 (N.J. 1945); see also Stop the Beach Ren. v.
Fla. Dept. of Envtl. Prot., 130 S. Ct. 2592, 2601 (2010) (“[T]hough the classic taking is a transfer of
property to the State or to another private party by eminent domain, the Takings Clause applies to other
state actions that achieve the same thing.”).
74. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
75. Id. at 415.
76. Numerous commentators have expressed dissatisfaction at the unsettled state of regulatory
takings law. See, e.g., Steven J. Eagle, Property Tests, Due Process Tests, and the Regulatory Takings
Jurisprudence, 2007 B.Y.U. L. REV. 899, 899 (2007) (declaring that the “United States Supreme Court’s
regulatory takings jurisprudence has long been infamous for its incoherence”); Eduardo Moises Penalver,
Is Land Special? The Unjustified Preference for Landownership in Regulatory Takings Law, 31 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 227, 228 (2004) (describing modern regulatory takings jurisprudence as a “massive (and growing)
swamp of muddled contraditions”); Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1078 (1993) (describing
the Takings Clause as “engulfed in confusion” and citing similar statements by Professors Bruce A.
Ackerman, Allison Dunham, Frank I. Michelman, Jeremy Paul, Andrea L. Peterson, Carol M. Rose,
Joseph L. Sax, and John A. Humbach as evidence of widespread dissatisfaction with takings
jurisprudence). Even some of the Justices on the Supreme Court have acknowledged the imperfection of
modern takings jurisprudence. See, e.g., Lingle, 544 U.S. at 539 (“Our regulatory takings jurisprudence
cannot be characterized as unified.”); Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 n.7
(1992) (conceding in dicta the ambiguities associated with the “deprivation of all economically feasible
use” rule that the Court upholds in the case).
77. The Court summarized all three categories of regulatory takings in its opinion in Lingle, 544 U.S.
at 538–39. A right to just compensation under the Takings Clause can also arise in the narrow context of
land use exactions, but such situations fall outside the scope of this Article. For a primer and thoughtful
critique of Takings Clause issues associated with land use exactions, see generally Lee Anne Fennell,
Hard Bargains and Real Steals: Land Use Exactions Revisited, 86 IOWA L. REV. 1 (2000) (arguing that
Takings Clause limitations on land use exactions can constrain efficient bargaining between municipalities
and developers).
78. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015 (describing categorical takings as ones that are “compensable
without case-specific inquiry into the public interest advanced in support of the restraint”).
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fall outside the parameters of the two per se rules.79 As the following Parts
show, many veiled airspace easement regulations like those imposed by the
FAA, Clark County, Suntown, and Beachville80 are unlikely to fit within any
of these three familiar categories of regulatory takings.
1. Per Se Physical Takings under Loretto?
Courts are unlikely to view veiled airspace easement regulations as per se
“physical takings” of airspace rights under current law because such
regulations arguably involve no physical occupation or invasion of private
property.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.81 is commonly cited for
the rule that a regulation can effect a per se physical taking if it requires an
owner to suffer a “permanent physical occupation” of private property.82 The
permanent physical occupation in Loretto resulted from a regulation allowing
a television cable company to install cable equipment on the roof and side of
a private apartment building.83 Even though the cable equipment occupied
only a small area on the claimant’s building and had minimal impacts on the
property’s overall value, the Loretto Court held that the regulation triggered a
taking.84 The Supreme Court has since reiterated the Loretto rule,
emphasizing that it applies “regardless of whether the interest that is taken
constitutes an entire parcel or merely a part thereof.”85
The Court has similarly classified the regular flying of government
airplanes through private airspace as a compensable per se physical taking
“no matter how small” the airspace invasion at issue.86 In United States v.

79. See infra text accompanying notes 106–08.
80. For descriptions of these types of actual and hypothetical regulations, see supra text
accompanying notes 42–70.
81. 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
82. Id. at 426 (holding that a “permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking
without regard to the public interests that it may serve”).
83. Id. at 421 (stating that the regulation at issue authorized the cable company to install facilities
that “occupied portions of appellant's roof and the side of her building”).
84. Indeed, some commentators have noted that the ultimate determination of Loretto’s
compensation suggests that the cable equipment on her building may have actually increased its market
value. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON & VICKI L. BEEN, LAND USE CONTROLS 168 (2005) (noting that the
Commission on Cable Television charged with determining just compensation in the wake of Loretto
“made only nominal awards of $1” to claimants under the statute challenged in the case, “reasoning that
the presence of cable television usually increased, rather than decreased, a building’s value”).
85. Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 322 (2002).
86. Id. (citing United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946)); see also Loretto, 458 U.S. at 438 n.16
(noting that “whether the installation is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it
occupies is bigger than a breadbox” and that the “displaced volume” of space at issue in the Loretto case
was “in excess of 1 ½ cubic feet”).
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Causby, the Court awarded just compensation to landowners when recurrent
military overflights substantially interfered with their chicken farm.87 The
Causby Court held that the military’s use of private airspace as a glide path
for airplanes amounted to the compensable taking of an easement, even
though the overflights did not totally destroy the value of the claimants’
property.88 According to the Court, the fact that the overflights “would limit
the utility of the land and cause a diminution in its value” was enough to
trigger a compensable taking.89
Like the military overflights in Causby, veiled airspace easement
regulations involve governmental use of private airspace and can result in
substantial financial injury to owners of that space.90 Nonetheless, such
regulations likely are not compensable takings under Loretto or Causby
because they involve no physical invasion or occupation of private space.91
This strong emphasis on actual physical invasion under modern takings
jurisprudence has drawn sharp criticism from takings scholars over the
years92 and is partly to blame for the current shortcomings in regulatory
takings law related to airspace. By allowing cases to hinge largely on the
question of physical invasion, existing takings rules underprotect citizens
against regulations imposed to secure private airspace for non-physical
government uses.
2. Total Regulatory Takings under Lucas?
The sorts of airspace restrictions described in Part II.A above are also
unlikely to trigger compensable takings under the familiar per se rule set forth
by the Supreme Court in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council.93 The

87. See Causby, 328 U.S. 256.
88. Id. at 261–62 (reasoning that there is “no material difference” between a case where government
overflights through private airspace prevented any use of the underlying land and a case where “[s]ome
value would remain” in the land but it would be worth less by virtue of the overflights).
89. Id. at 262.
90. For the earlier description of the FAA regulations at issue, see supra text accompanying notes
42–45.
91. A wind energy developer might be able to argue that the military’s radar waves themselves are
invading private airspace, although such an argument would run counter to the weight of case law that
narrowly interprets “physical invasion” when distinguishing nuisance from trespass. See Adams v.
Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 602 N.W.2d 215, 67–68 (Mich. App. 1999) (determining that noise, vibrations
and dust were not sufficiently tangible for invasions of them onto a landowner’s property to give rise to a
trespass claim).
92. See, e.g., Andrea L. Peterson, The False Dichotomy between Physical and Regulatory Takings
Analysis: A Critique of Tahoe-Sierra’s Distinction between Physical and Regulatory Takings, 34 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 381, 384 (2007) (asserting that the Supreme Court’s emphasis on physical invasion in its takings
jurisprudence is “analytically unsound”).
93. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
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Lucas rule requires that governments justly compensate private citizens
whenever their regulations deprive citizens of “all economically beneficial
uses” of their property.94 At first glance, the Lucas rule may seem like a more
promising approach to challenging veiled airspace easement regulations than
the Loretto rule because the Lucas rule requires no evidence of a physical
invasion. Justice Scalia specifically described the Lucas rule as an identifier
of restrictions that, “from a landowner’s point of view, [are] the equivalent of
a physical appropriation.”95 Veiled airspace easement regulations often fit
that description.96 However, for the reasons that follow, United States courts’
established approach to applying the Lucas rule excludes veiled airspace
easement regulations from its purview.
The perpetual challenge in applying the Lucas rule is that of defining the
property to which its “all economically beneficial use” test should apply. The
Court had no difficulty defining the relevant property in Lucas because the
claimant in that case held an undivided fee simple interest in a clearly-defined
parcel and the challenged regulation precluded economically viable use of all
of it.97 Unfortunately, identifying the relevant property for takings analysis
under the Lucas rule is not always so straightforward. As Justice Scalia
famously noted in his majority opinion in Lucas:
Regrettably, the rhetorical force of our “deprivation of all
economically feasible use” rule is greater than its precision, since the
rule does not make clear the “property interest” against which the loss
of value is to be measured . . . . Unsurprisingly, this uncertainty
regarding the composition of the denominator in our “deprivation”
fraction has produced inconsistent pronouncements by the Court.98
This persistent uncertainty regarding how to determine the appropriate
“denominator” for a Lucas analysis has been the focus of much legal

94. Id. at 1019.
95. Id. at 1017.
96. The similarities between veiled airspace easement regulations and physical appropriations of
airspace were highlighted in the previous Part. See also infra text accompanying note 130.
97. See Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1016 n.7 (noting that the Court was able to circumvent the difficult task of
the identifying relevant property “in the present case, since the ‘interest in land’ that Lucas has pleaded (a
fee simple interest) is an estate with a rich tradition of protection at common law”).
98. Id. (citing Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 414 (1922)); Keystone Bituminous
Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 497–502 (1987)). Amidst this uncertainty, some courts have
sought to set forth factors for determining the relevant parcel for a takings analysis. See, e.g., Norman v.
United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 231, 253 (2004) (stating “[t]here is no rigid formula for determining the
appropriate parcel in regulatory takings cases,” and listing multiple factors courts may consider in
determining what is the relevant parcel), aff’d, 429 F.3d 1081 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
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scholarship over the years and continues to complicate applications of the
Lucas rule.99
Most veiled airspace easement regulations are unlikely to constitute
compensable takings under the Lucas rule because courts are reluctant to
designate airspace rights alone as the “denominator” when applying the rule.
The Court famously declined to isolate airspace rights from the fee estate for
purposes of takings analysis in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of
New York.100 The joint plaintiffs in Penn Central were owners of Manhattan’s
famous Grand Central Terminal and lessees of rights in the airspace above it.
When the City of New York refused to approve a proposal for an office tower
above the terminal because of the site’s historic landmark status under a city
ordinance,101 the plaintiffs filed a claim arguing that the ordinance took their
airspace rights—a “valuable property interest”—without just
compensation.102 The Court ultimately dismissed the claim, effectively
rejecting the notion that airspace can be considered separately from the fee
estate for regulatory takings analysis. Writing for the majority, Justice
Brennan declared:
‘Taking’ jurisprudence does not divide a single parcel into discrete
segments and attempt to determine whether rights in a particular
segment have been entirely abrogated . . . .103
In the decades following Penn Central, the Court has reiterated that claimants
may not “conceptually sever” specific property interests such as airspace
rights from the fee estate for purposes of takings analysis.104 This rule against
99. See, e.g., Eagle, supra note 14, at 934 (suggesting that “courts look to the concept of the
‘commercial unit’” under the Uniform Commercial Code in determining the denominator); John E. Fee,
Unearthing the Denominator in Regulatory Taking Claims, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 1535, 1538 (1994)
(proposing an “independent economic viability” standard for defining the denominator in regulatory
takings cases); Marc R. Lisker, Regulatory Takings and the Denominator Problem, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 663,
721 (1995) (advocating for a rule that “[i]f the state law applicable to the property at issue recognizes the
separate and distinct existence of the estate that one of the litigants seeks to sever (in making the
denominator determination), then such severance is appropriate”); Daniel R. Mandelker, New Property
Rights under the Taking Clause, 81 MARQ. L. REV. 9, 19 (1997) (arguing that the “Court should not make
the rules on [defining the denominator] a ‘set formula’ that determines whether a taking has occurred” but
should instead “decide takings cases by making explicit value choices in the wide array of land use
conflicts in which takings claims arise”).
100. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
101. Id. at 104 (stating that the Penn Central case initially arose after New York City’s Landmark
Preservation Commission rejected the claimants’ plans for a building project above Grand Central
Terminal as “destructive of the Terminal’s historic and aesthetic features”).
102. Id. at 130.
103. Id.
104. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 331 (2002)
(stating that the claimants' “conceptual severance” argument was “unavailing because it ignores Penn
Central's admonition that in regulatory takings cases we must focus on ‘the parcel as a whole’” and noting
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analyzing airspace separately from the fee estate precludes just compensation
under Lucas for most veiled airspace easement regulations. Because
landowners whose properties are burdened by such regulations usually retain
some possessory rights in their parcel’s surface, the regulations do not
destroy all economically viable use of their land and would not ordinarily
trigger compensation under the Lucas rule.105
3. Partial Takings under Penn Central?
Claimants who cannot establish compensable regulatory takings under
Loretto or Lucas are relegated to arguing their claims under the ad hoc test set
forth in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.106 Most veiled
airspace easement regulations are also unlikely to trigger compensable
takings under this Penn Central test.
As mentioned above, the regulatory takings claim in Penn Central
centered on the expensive column of airspace situated directly above New
York City’s historic Grand Central Terminal.107 The Penn Central court
analyzed the claim using multi-factor test that required “essentially ad hoc,
factual inquiries”108 into the “economic impact” of the regulation at issue, the
“extent to which it has interfered with investment-backed expectations,” and
the “character of the governmental action” involved.109 Upon weighing each
of these factors, the Court ultimately held that no just compensation was due
for the severe airspace restrictions resulting from the city’s landmark
preservation ordinance.110
that the Court had “consistently rejected such an approach to the ‘denominator’ question”).
105. See, e.g., Fitzgerrald v. City of Iowa City, 492 N.W.2d 659, 665–66 (Iowa 1992) (determining
that landowners whose properties were subjected to airport height restrictions were not entitled to just
compensation under the Takings Clause because their claims were based solely on property value
decreases from a resulting loss in development potential and the landowners retained some economically
viable use of the property); see also Kimberlin v. City of Topeka, 710 P.2d 682, 688 (Kan. 1985) (refusing
to award just compensation to landowners whose properties were burdened by airport height restrictions
based on principle set forth in Penn Central that analysis of such claims requires consideration of the
“parcel as a whole” and that the challenged restriction in no way “interferes with the present use of the
property”).
106. See supra note 3. For a discussion of the facts of the Penn Central case and how the case impacts
the question of whether regulations on wind energy development could ever amount to a compensable
taking, see infra text accompanying notes 100–04.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 100–02.
108. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
109. The Supreme Court summarized Penn Central’s multi-factor test in a later court decision. See
Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528 (2005).
110. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 138. Among other things, the Court found that the challenged
ordinance did not preclude the terminal from continuing to operate as it had done for decades and that its
owners reciprocally benefited from the preservation of other historic structures in the city. Id. at 134–36.
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Some veiled airspace easement regulations could conceivably be deemed
compensable takings under the Penn Central test. The Supreme Court has
emphasized in the years following Penn Central that takings that deprived
owners of less than all economically viable use of their property were
sometimes compensable under the test,111 and under the right circumstances a
court applying it might determine that a veiled taking of an airspace easement
warranted just compensation.112
However, the basic characteristics of such regulations make it difficult to
successfully challenge them under Penn Central. For example, courts
weighing the “economic impact” of a regulation under the Penn Central test
tend to consider the entire fee estate rather than looking solely at impacts on
airspace or some other discrete stick in the claimant’s bundle of rights.113
Landowners generally retain surface rights under veiled airspace easement
regulations, so the economic impact of such restrictions is often
comparatively small, reducing the prospect of just compensation.114 Inquiries
into whether a veiled airspace easement regulation substantially interferes
with “investment-backed expectations” are also unlikely to favor the
awarding of just compensation because in most instances landowners can
continue their existing property uses under such regulations.115 And the
significant discretion afforded to courts under the Penn Central test’s

111. See, e.g., Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001) (citing Penn Central, 438 U.S. at
124) (stating that a regulation that “fall[s] short of eliminating all economically beneficial use” can still
constitute a compensable taking, “depending on a complex of factors including the regulation’s
. . . [interferences] with reasonable investment-backed expectations, and the character of the government
action”).
112. For instance, land use regulations that overtly singled out and burdened a very small number of
properties would tend to exhibit less reciprocity of advantage and would thus be more compensable in
“character” under the test. Likewise, in cases where a claimant had already expended large sums of money
on a proposed project only to have a veiled airspace easement regulation halt it, higher “investment-backed
expectations” are involved so claimants under Penn Central might stand a better chance of success.
113. The Penn Central Court adopted this approach of focusing on the “parcel as a whole” when
considering economic impacts. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 130–31 (noting that courts considering the
economic impact of a regulation in the takings context must look at the “extent of the interference with
rights in the parcel as a whole”).
114. Courts analyzing the “economic impact” of regulations under the Penn Central test face the same
sort of denominator problem that arises under Lucas and may also be reluctant to conceptually sever
airspace rights from the surface estate when applying this element of Penn Central. See Mandelker, supra
note 99, at 11 (noting that the segmentation problem with respect to determining the “property interests a
land use regulation affects” arises under both Lucas and the “balancing test” prescribed under Penn
Central).
115. For instance, the Penn Central Court cited the claimant’s ability to continue operating Grand
Central Terminal when finding minimal interference with investment-backed expectations in that case. See
Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 136 (noting that New York City’s Landmark Preservation Ordinance “not only
permits but contemplates that appellants may continue to use the property precisely as it has been used for
the past 65 years: as a railroad terminal containing office space and concessions”).
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nebulous factors invites uncertainty and expense capable of deterring even
the strongest of claimants from seeking compensation under the test.116
Unfortunately, the Penn Central test often provides the only plausible line
of argument for victims of veiled takings of airspace easements under current
law. For the reasons just described, this heavy reliance on the Penn Central
test to identify veiled takings of airspace easements makes it difficult for
modern takings laws to ensure fair and efficient allocations of airspace rights
between private citizens and their governments.
III. FILLING THE GAP: A TAKINGS RULE FOR VEILED AIRSPACE
EASEMENT REGULATIONS
How could the Supreme Court best address the deficiencies in its takings
jurisprudence relating to airspace? As renewable energy and sustainable
development strategies steadily increase landowner competition for scarce
airspace,117 the temptation for public entities to secure airspace use rights
through regulation will only grow. Courts could help to deter this practice by
embracing an additional, supplemental takings rule that distinguishes veiled
airspace easement regulations from ordinary land use controls and requires
governments that impose the former to justly compensate affected citizens. If
carefully designed, such a rule could fill a significant gap in takings law
without materially disrupting existing takings jurisprudence.
The Court has emphasized on multiple occasions that its regulatory
takings rules seek above all to identify government actions that are
functionally equivalent to classic takings under eminent domain.118
Regulatory takings can occur in myriad contexts and disguises, and the facts
and circumstances that give rise to them are seldom the same from case to
case. Crafting a manageable set of rules that is capable of rooting out the full
subset of regulations that warrant just compensation under the Takings
Clause from a vast spectrum of diverse government activities is thus
extremely difficult, if not impossible.119

116. See, e.g., Joel R. Burcat & Julia M. Glencer, Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Regional Planning Agency: Is There a There There?, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 11212, 11220 (2002) (declaring
that the Supreme Court's “emphasis in Tahoe-Sierra on the case-by-case evaluation to be made under Penn
Central leaves the fate of takings claims more uncertain than ever”).
117. For a discussion of the role of airspace in sustainable development and renewable energy, see
generally Rule, supra note 5, at 285–90.
118. See supra notes 72–73 and accompanying text; see also Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1129
(“[F]rom Mugler to Lucas, the [Supreme Court] Justices have repeatedly invoked the language of usings to
support . . . [the] takings doctrine, [and know] that the strongest case for compensation is presented by
facts closely analogous to exercises of eminent domain . . . .”).
119. The majority in Penn Central plainly conceded that the “question of what constitutes a ‘taking’
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The Court has at least tentatively settled upon its present, imperfect twopart approach to detecting compensable regulatory takings. On the one hand,
the Court has set forth the amorphous multi-factor test in Penn Central,
which gives courts broad discretion to sniff out compensable takings through
highly fact-specific inquiries and comparatively loose analysis.120 On the
other hand, the Court has adopted the Lucas and Loretto rules—bright-line
tests that allow for relatively low-cost identification of the most obvious
regulatory takings and thereby spare a large subset of takings claimants from
having to argue their claims under Penn Central’s cumbersome ad hoc test.121
A major shortcoming of the Court’s two-part approach to regulatory
takings law is that it systematically underprotects citizens against
compensation-worthy regulations that happen to fall outside the Lucas and
Loretto rules. The only option available to victims of such regulations is risky
litigation under Penn Central’s ambiguous and discretionary factors. Facing
such an uncertain course, some legitimate takings claimants are apt to never
file claims at all, allowing government exploitation of private property to
continue unchecked.
Over the years, commentators have offered up several broad ideas for
improving takings law, and some of those approaches, if adopted, might well
have provided for just compensation to victims of veiled takings of airspace
easements.122 However, the simplest and least disruptive way to improve
upon the Supreme Court’s existing two-part approach to takings law as it
for purposes of the Fifth Amendment has proved to be a problem of considerable difficulty” for the
Supreme Court. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 123.
120. Id. at 124 (noting that the Supreme Court had been “unable to develop any ‘set formula’” for
identifying compensable regulatory takings and that such analysis required “essentially ad hoc, factual
inquiries” aimed at finding cases where justice and fairness necessitated an award of just compensation).
121. The Loretto Court signaled that its test was intended to be a shorthand rule, arguing that a
permanent physical occupation is “of such a unique character that it is a taking without regard to other
factors that a court might ordinarily examine.” Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
419, 432 (1982). The Lucas court similarly justified its rule on the ground that any regulation involving
total deprivation of all economically beneficial use was “the equivalent of a physical appropriation” of
property and thus compensable without further inquiry. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1017 (1992). Legal scholars have recognized the Supreme Court’s apparent trend toward bright line
rules to help complement Penn Central’s ad hoc approach. See Penalver, supra note 76, at 229 (citing
multiple academic articles as defending the view that Lucas was a “prime example of the Court’s efforts to
create clarity out of murkiness” by adopting some concrete takings rules).
122. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council: A Tangled Web of
Expectations, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1369, 1374 (1993) (arguing that just compensation under the Takings
Clause should be due for any “partial restriction that tracks in content a private restrictive covenant”); John
E. Fee, The Takings Clause as a Comparative Right, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1003, 1007 (2003) (suggesting
that just compensation should be payable in any circumstance “where the government legitimately targets
merely one or a few owners to bear a unique legal burden for the benefit of the general community”);
Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1127–29 (advocating a jurisprudence of “usings” that awards just
compensation whenever property is taken “for some particular use dictated by the state”).
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relates to airspace would be to introduce an additional carve-out rule to
supplement the existing categorical taking rules under Lucas and Loretto.
This new rule could be narrowly tailored to protect citizens against the sorts
of regulations described in Part II.A above without unduly constraining
governments’ legitimate regulation of airspace. Specifically, the new rule
could require just compensation for government actions that (i) deprived
citizens of possessory interests in airspace to (ii) facilitate a public entity’s
own exploitation of that space. The following two Parts discuss each element
of this proposed rule.
A. Element #1: Deprivation of a Possessory Interest in Airspace
As a threshold matter, any new takings rule for veiled airspace easement
regulations would need to require a showing that the challenged government
action deprived the claimant of a valuable property interest.123 Proving
deprivation of a property interest is admittedly not as straightforward for
veiled takings of airspace easements as it is in most other takings cases.
Veiled airspace easement regulations involve no government invasion or
occupation of private property, so they tend not to produce hard physical
evidence of deprivation. Rather, they involve more subtle losses of airspace
rights under height restrictions or other land use controls that prohibit
possessory use of the restricted space.124 The scope of acceptable means for
establishing deprivation in the veiled airspace easement regulation context
would thus need to be broad enough to encompass cases involving neither
physical contact with the restricted space nor interference with existing
surface uses. Claimants would need to be able to satisfy this first prong by
showing no more than a loss of possessory airspace rights equivalent to those
forfeited under a negative airspace easement.125
This liberal standard for establishing deprivation of private property
would more closely resemble the standard in Loretto than that in Lucas
because it would require only proof of deprivation of airspace rights—rights
amounting to less than a fee simple or fully-severed estate.126 Admittedly, the

123. The Penn Central case, which focused on airspace rights, emphasizes that such evidence of
deprivation is a basic requirement under the Takings Clause. Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 142–43 (describing
the need to determine whether a challenged government action has destroyed valuable “property” and
emphasizing that the Court broadly interprets “property” in this context).
124. The FAA, Clark County, Suntown, and Beachville examples above all fit this description.
Descriptions of these regulations are found in Part II.A above. See supra text accompanying notes 42–70.
125. A negative easement is “[a]n easement that prohibits the servient-estate owner from doing
something, such as building an obstruction” on the burdened parcel. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 587 (9th
ed. 2009).
126. To review the basic characteristics of these two per se regulatory takings rules, see supra text
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sorts of permanent physical occupations that can trigger Loretto takings tend
to make for stronger takings arguments than can be made against veiled
airspace easement regulations. Permanent physical occupations not only
deprive citizens of possession and physical use of the occupied property; they
also effectively divest citizens of rights to exclude another party from those
areas. In contrast, veiled airspace easement regulations involve no physical
intrusion and would not ordinarily give rise to a trespass claim.127 In that
sense, the higher deprivation standard in Lucas requiring evidence of a loss of
economically viable use of an entire fee estate might seem more appropriate.
However, excessive focus on whether a government action involves a
physical invasion distracts attention from the basic objective of the Lucas and
Loretto rules. Above all, such rules are intended to be shorthand tools for
identifying cases that are functionally equivalent to classic takings,128 and the
economic transfers resulting from veiled airspace easement regulations can
resemble classic takings as much as the physical occupations and total
deprivations that trigger just compensation under Loretto and Lucas. From
the perspective of a private landowner, the economic loss suffered from a
prohibition on physical airspace uses—no buildings, trees, wind turbines, or
anything else within the restricted space—is often the same regardless of
whether a government entity ever invades the space.129 The burden on a
landowner whose property is subjected to a veiled airspace easement
regulation closely mirrors that of a servient owner under a negative airspace
easement in that neither can make possessory use of the space.130 Likewise,
the practical benefits inuring to governments under such regulations resemble
those of grantees under negative easements.131 When public entities exercise
their eminent domain power to formally take airspace easements for airport
flight paths, they must compensate landowners for those rights regardless of

accompanying notes 81–83, and 93–99.
127. At common law, liability for trespass can arise whenever a defendant “enters land in the
possession of the other, or causes a thing or a third person to do so.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 158 (1965).
128. Other commentators have emphasized this idea. See, e.g., Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1127–28
(noting that “taking an easement by eminent domain need not deprive an owner of all beneficial use of his
property, yet always has required compensation”); see also supra note 121 and accompanying text.
129. The Lucas majority clearly embraced this view of the impact of deprivation of use. See Lucas v.
S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“[T]otal deprivation of beneficial use is, from
the landowner’s point of view, the equivalent of physical appropriation.”). In support of its position, the
Court referenced Coke’s famous line: “[F]or what is the land but the profits thereof[?]”. Id. (citation
omitted).
130. For a definition of “negative easement,” see supra note 125.
131. See Cheyenne Airport Bd. v. Rogers, 707 P.2d 717, 730 (Wyo. 1985) (stating that the “holder of
a negative easement has, by virtue of such an interest, no right to active use; rather the holder can merely
insist that the burdened party refrain from certain uses or uses in certain areas”).
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whether the private landowner retains some interest in the surface.132 Why
not, then, award just compensation when a public entity seeks to improve its
own resource position by securing similar airspace easement rights under the
guise of land use regulation?
Of course, a chief risk of expanding the scope of categorical takings
protections is that doing so could open the floodgates for more takings claims
that could excessively constrain governments’ ability to regulate. From the
early stages of its regulatory takings jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
taken great pains to prevent the Takings Clause from unduly stifling land use
regulatory authority. Justice Holmes famously encapsulated this caution in
his statement in Mahon that “government could hardly go on” under
regulatory takings rules that too liberally awarded just compensation.133 The
second prong of the proposed takings rule for veiled airspace easement
regulations described immediately below is expressly aimed at limiting the
rule’s applicability and thereby mitigating this risk.
B. Element #2: Government Use of the Regulated Space
In addition to showing that the challenged regulation deprived them
possessory use of their airspace, claimants under the proposed takings rule for
veiled airspace easement regulations would have to prove that the
government actually exploited the restricted space for its own benefit. Such
non-incidental government use of private property is what makes veiled
airspace easement regulations “functionally equivalent to the classic taking”
and distinguishes them from ordinary police power restrictions.134
Local governments have been using height restrictions and other land use
controls for nearly a century to coordinate airspace uses among landowners
and thereby promote the general welfare of the citizenry.135 Conventional
height restrictions compel all landowners in the restricted area to forfeit
possessory rights in some of the airspace above their parcels but also benefit
all landowners by ensuring open space above neighboring parcels.136 This
“reciprocity of advantage” among landowners is a familiar characteristic of

132. For a description of some common situations in which governments use eminent domain to
acquire rights in airspace, see generally supra text accompanying notes 37–39.
133. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922).
134. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
135. For an abstract model illustrating this role of height restrictions in more detail, see Rule, supra
note 9; see also infra text accompanying notes 173–78.
136. Rule, supra note 9, at 285 (“Although bulk and height restrictions force landowners to forfeit
their rights to occupy the airspace above their land, such restrictions are typically reciprocal in that they
require nearly all neighboring landowners to give up those same rights and nearly all landowners get the
same general benefit from the restrictions.”).
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the sorts of legitimate police power regulations that tend not to trigger
compensable takings.137
Regulatory takings laws seek not to hinder valuable police power
regulation but to target those restrictions by which “private property is being
pressed into some form of public service under the guise of mitigating serious
public harm.”138 Restrictions conforming to this description resemble classic
takings by eminent domain and warrant the payment of just compensation
under the Takings Clause.
1. Previous Calls for a Government Use Test: Enterpriser vs. Arbiter
Professor Joseph Sax highlighted the distinction between ordinary police
power regulations and laws that facilitate governmental use of private
property in a 1962 law review article that advocated broad use of this
distinction in regulatory takings law. In Sax’s view:
[W]hen an individual or limited group in society sustains a detriment
to legally acquired existing economic values as a consequence of
government activity which enhances the economic value of some
governmental enterprise, then the act is a taking, and compensation is
constitutionally required; but when the challenged act is an
improvement of the public condition through resolution of conflict
within the private sector of the society, compensation is not
constitutionally required.139
Sax expounded on the important difference between the government’s role as
an enterpriser and its role as an arbiter of private disputes, noting that the
government as an enterpriser:
“. . . operates in a host of areas, requiring money, equipment and real
estate. It maintains an army which must be fed and clothed and
137. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 331, 350 (2002)
(citing references to “reciprocity of advantage” considerations in Penn Central, Lucas, and Mahon).
138. Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1018 (1992).
139. Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 67 (1964). A somewhat
comparable distinction at common law that is worthy of mention in this context is that between
“governmental” and “proprietary” functions. Although many “enterprise” activities under Sax’s test would
also be “proprietary” government functions under that common law distinction, at least some enterpriser
activities—such as fire protection—would not qualify as proprietary, so the government-proprietary
distinction is of limited value in this discussion. For a basic description of this other distinction, see
generally OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR., LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 12 (1982) (describing the difference
between proprietary and governmental local government functions and noting that “police and fire
protection” were usually classified as governmental functions).
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supplied; it builds and maintains bridges and roads and buildings, and
for these it must have land and other economic resources . . .”140
In contrast, the government in its role as an arbiter merely “mediates the
disputes of various citizens and groups within society . . . , defining standards
to reconcile differences among the private interests in the community.”141
The FAA, Clark County, Suntown, and Beachville restrictions described
in Part II.A above142 would each qualify as compensable takings under Sax’s
government use test. Each aims not to resolve conflicts confined within the
private sector but to economically benefit some specific government
enterprise—the sort of government use that Sax argued made some
regulations functionally equivalent to classic takings and worthy of just
compensation under the Takings Clause.143 However, although Sax’s
arguments were a notable contribution to the regulatory takings debate,144 the
Supreme Court ultimately declined to embrace them and instead adopted its
current pair of shorthand rules focused on physical invasion and total
deprivation, and its ad hoc Penn Central test.145

140. Sax, supra note 139, at 62.
141. Id. at 62–63. Jed Rubenfeld also proffered a test for identifying compensable government uses.
See Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1116–17 (suggesting that, “[if] the state’s interest in taking or regulating
something would be equally well served by destroying the thing altogether . . . , no use–value of the thing
is being exploited,” so no compensation would be due under his “usings” test).
142. See supra text accompanying notes 42–70.
143. Curiously, Sax observed that compensable takings could sometimes arise under his test even
when there was no physical invasion of private property. Without elaborating on when such non-physical
takings could occur, Sax wrote:
To be sure, the acquisition of title or the taking of physical possession will be present in the great
majority of taking cases under this theory. But—and this is the important point—the presence or
absence of a formal title-acquisition and/or invasion will never be conclusive. These formalities
are not necessarily present when the government, as an enterpriser, is acquiring resources for its
own account.
Id. at 67.
144. In the 1970s and 1980s, some courts in New York and Pennsylvania specifically referenced Sax’s
rule. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330 (N.Y. 1981), rev’d,
458 U.S. 419 (1982) (citing Sax’s article for the argument that whether a regulatory taking occurs depends
on whether the government “acts in its enterprise capacity” and must pay just compensation, or acts in its
“arbitral capacity, as where it legislates zoning or provides the machinery to enjoin noxious use”); Alco
Parking Corp. v. City of Pittsburgh, 307 A.2d 851, 863 n.14 (Pa. 1973), rev’d, 417 U.S. 369 (1974)
(describing Sax’s test in detail and concluding that it was “indeed logical” and aided the court’s analysis in
takings claim over city’s taxation of private parking lots in competition with publicly-owned lots).
145. The Supreme Court has seemingly recognized the value of Sax’s distinction in the narrow
context of one of the factors for assessing the “character of the government action” under a Penn Central
analysis. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 128 (1978) (citing Sax’s article,
Causby, and other sources for the general proposition that “government actions that may be characterized
as acquisitions of resources to permit or facilitate uniquely public functions have often been held to
constitute ‘takings’”).
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In 1993, nearly thirty years after Sax published his article, Professor Jed
Rubenfeld made a similar case for greater emphasis on government use in
regulatory takings law.146 Rubenfeld argued that current laws paid too much
attention to the word “taken” in the Takings Clause and not enough to the
phrase “public use.”147 He advocated requiring just compensation in all cases
of what he called government “usings”—situations where “the state ha[d] in
effect taken over property and exploited it for some government-dictated
use.”148
Unfortunately, by 1993 the Court had already laid down its rules in Penn
Central, Loretto, and Lucas, all of which pay minimal attention to the
question of government use of the allegedly taken property.149 One possible
reason for the Court’s rejection of any government use test is that identifying
a compensable level of government use involves a more discretionary inquiry
than is required to show physical invasion or arguably even total deprivation
of economically beneficial use.150 The Lucas and Loretto rules are convenient
in that they require no government use analysis, allowing courts to quickly
identify many types of compensable regulatory takings without any inquiry
into whether the government ever used the allegedly taken property.151
Unfortunately, the Lucas and Loretto rules fail to protect against the sorts
of takings of airspace rights that are the focus of this Article. Thus, even
though the proposed rule for veiled takings of airspace easements would
require a more discretionary government use analysis, such analysis would
apply in only the small subset of takings cases involving airspace. The
additional complexity in this narrow range of circumstances under the
supplemental rule seems justifiable, given that the rule would spare claimants
in these contexts from having to rely on arguments under Penn Central’s
ambiguous factors.

146. See generally Rubenfeld, supra note 76.
147. Id. at 1149 (advocating greater focus on government “usings” in regulatory takings law).
148. Id. at 1129.
149. The Penn Central, Loretto, and Lucas decisions were published in 1978, 1982, and 1992,
respectively. Penn Central, 438 U.S. 104 (1978); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458
U.S. 419 (1982); Lucas v. S. Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
150. As discussed in Part II.B.2 above, difficulties in defining the “denominator” for a Lucas analysis
can greatly complicate determinations of whether a given government action has caused a total deprivation
of all economically beneficial use. For a discussion of this problem, see supra text accompanying notes
97–99.
151. A statement taken from the Penn Central majority opinion reinforces the notion that the Supreme
Court’s heavy focus on physical invasion is an attempt to quickly distinguish regulations that are
equivalent to classic takings from those that are not. See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (stating that a
“‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some public program adjusting the
benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good”) (internal citation omitted).
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A rule applying the sort of government use test advocated by Professors
Sax and Rubenfeld to the narrow context of airspace restrictions would also
arguably be consistent with the Supreme Court’s existing jurisprudence. In
fact, the Penn Central Court specifically made use of this government use
distinction to distinguish the facts in Penn Central from those in Causby. The
majority in Penn Central noted that, in Causby, the “government, acting in an
enterprise capacity, . . . appropriated part of [the claimants’] property for
some strictly governmental purpose.”152 In contrast, the New York landmark
ordinance at issue in Penn Central neither “exploit[ed]” the Grand Central
Terminal “parcel for city purposes nor facilitate[d] nor ar[ose] from any
entrepreneurial operations of the city.”153
2. The Distinguishing Power of a Government Use Requirement
The government use requirement described above would enable the
proposed additional takings rule to differentiate ordinary police power
regulations of airspace from the sorts of compensation-worthy rules imposed
by Suntown, Beachville, Clark County, and the FAA. This distinguishing
power is easy to recognize when the rule is applied to the New York City
landmark preservation ordinance challenged in Penn Central.154 That
ordinance’s restriction on building above Grand Central Terminal effectively
deprived the Penn Central claimants of possessory use of some highly
valuable airspace,155 meeting the first prong of the proposed rule. However,
the restriction was motivated by a general public interest in historic
preservation,156 and the city government neither exploited nor sought to
exploit the restricted space. The Penn Central claimants would have thus
been unable to satisfy the government use prong and avail themselves of the
proposed takings rule.
Suppose instead that New York City’s prohibition on development above
the Grand Central Terminal was motivated solely by the city’s desire to
preserve scenic views for a nearby city government office tower. Under those
facts, the city would have been exercising its regulatory power to enable it to
exploit private airspace and materially improve the city government’s own
resource position, so the restriction would have been compensable under the
proposed rule. This sort of government exploitation of airspace is more akin

152. Id. at 135.
153. Id.
154. A brief description of the facts surrounding the famous Penn Central case is set forth in Part
II.B.2 above. See supra notes 100–03 and accompanying text.
155. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
156. Id.
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to the action that triggered a compensable taking in Causby—a case in which
the United States military had not “merely destroyed property” but was
“using a part of it for the flight of its planes.”157
A comparison of two recent restrictions on commercial wind energy
further demonstrates how the proposed rule’s government use requirement
could differentiate compensable veiled airspace easement regulations from
ordinary land use controls. On the one hand, consider the county ordinance
recently challenged in Zimmerman v. Board of County Commissioners of
Wabaunsee County.158 Zimmerman arose when the Board of Commissioner
of Wabaunsee County, Kansas, adopted an ordinance prohibiting commercial
wind energy development throughout the county.159 The undisputed impetus
for the ordinance was a general concern that wind energy development would
compromise the aesthetic appeal of the county’s pristine rural areas,
including portions of the scenic Flint Hills.160 The ordinance effectively
deprived rural landowners of possessory use of the airspace above their land
and would have thus satisfied the first element of the proposed takings rule.161

157. United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 262–63 n.7 (1946). At least one other commentator has
noted the Causby Court’s focus on the government’s use of the airspace at issue in that case. See Anne R.
Pramaggiore, The Supreme Court’s Trilogy of Regulatory Takings: Keystone, Glendale, and Nollan, 38
DEPAUL L. REV. 441, 463 (1988) (noting that the Court’s opinion seemed to recognize “the fact that the
government utilized the airspace for its own benefit” and that the government was “acting in its enterprise
capacity” in flying planes over the Causbys’ property in ways that “enhance[d] [the government’s] own
resource position”).
158. The Kansas Supreme Court partially ruled on Zimmerman in 2009, but requested further briefing
from the parties on the claimant’s takings claim. Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Wabaunsee
Cnty., 218 P.3d 400, 405 (Kan. 2009) [hereinafter “Zimmerman I”] (stating that, concurrent with the
release of the court’s opinion in the case, the court had “ordered the parties to submit supplemental briefs
on certain questions . . . originally presented on appeal,” including whether the county board’s broad
prohibition on commercial wind energy development “violated the Takings Clause”). The Kansas Supreme
Court issued a subsequent opinion in late 2011 analyzing the takings issue and other previously unresolved
matters. Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Wabaunsee Cnty., 264 P.3d. 989 (Kan. 2011)
[hereinafter “Zimmerman II”].
159. See Zimmerman II, 264 P.3d at 997 (quoting county ordinance language specifying that
“Commercial Wind Energy Conversion Systems are not a use that may be approved or permitted as a
Conditional Use in Wabaunsee County and are specifically prohibited”). The Flint Hills stretch across
several rural Kansas counties, including much of Wabaunsee County, and “contain the vast majority of the
remaining Tallgrass Prairie that once covered much of the central United States.” Id. at 994. For more
information about the Flint Hills and their significance, see Great Plains Nature Center, The Meadow,
http://www.gpnc.org/meadow.htm (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
160. See Zimmerman II, 264 P.3d at 997 (noting that the county’s prohibition on commercial wind
farms was based partly on a determination that large wind turbines would be “incompatible with the rural,
agricultural, and scenic character of the County”).
161. More particularly, the ordinance prohibited commercial wind energy development. See
Zimmerman I, 218 P.3d at 407 (describing Wabaunsee County ordinance as prohibiting wind turbine
installations exceeding 120 feet in height). Conceivably, cell phone towers could make economically
viable use of some very small fraction of the Wabaunsee County’s airspace above 120 feet, but it is
difficult to conceive of any other economically viable possessory uses of such space given the county’s
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However, the ordinance would not have satisfied the second element of the
rule because it was not adopted to enable some government entity to exploit
the restricted space for its own benefit. The ordinance did not improve the
resource position of the county government or of any other government
enterprise and was aimed solely at preserving general aesthetic benefits for
the county’s citizenry.
In contrast, consider the FAA wind farm restrictions described in Part
II.A.1 above, which seek to prevent interference with military radar.162 Like
the ordinance at issue in Zimmerman, the FAA restrictions deprive
landowners of valuable possessory airspace interests and would thus satisfy
the first element of the proposed rule. However, the FAA restrictions differ
from the Wabaunsee County ordinance in that they are driven solely by a
federal entity’s desire to keep the airspace clear to serve the entity’s own
purposes—an overt government use of the space.163 Even if a wind energy
developer held all the state and local approvals required to develop its wind
farm, an FAA restriction based on a request from the DOD could still hinder
the project. Such restrictions are aimed not at governing airspace conflicts
among private landowners, but rather at securing privately-owned resources
for use by a specific government entity. Restrictions motivated by this sort of
government self-interest contrast starkly with conventional police power
restrictions like the Wabaunsee County ordinance and merit the payment of
just compensation.164
C. Measuring Just Compensation
Successful claimants under the supplemental takings rule advocated in this
Article would obviously be entitled to just compensation from the
government entity that imposed the challenged regulation. Like landowners
in most other types of takings cases, these claimants would bear the burden of

rural character and low population density. As of 2010, only 7,053 people resided in the county. See
QuickFacts: Wabaunsee County, Kansas, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/
20/20197.html (last updated Sept. 18, 2012).
162. See supra text accompanying notes 42–46.
163. As the Supreme Court has made clear, the fact that military radar systems promote homeland
security and public safety does not give the government license to take private property rights without
compensation in protecting those systems. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)
(declaring that “a strong public desire to improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving
the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change”).
164. Of course, the Wabaunsee County ordinance and other restrictions falling outside the scope of
Lucas, Loretto, and the proposed veiled airspace easements rule could still potentially be compensable
under the Penn Central test. The proposed rule would merely expand the subset of instances in which
takings claimants could obtain just compensation without having to engage in a Penn Central analysis.
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establishing the amount of just compensation due.165 Valuing easements can
be difficult, since most types of easements are infrequently bought and
sold.166 However, the compensation amount could be determined through the
same sorts of valuation methods commonly used for takings of easements
through eminent domain. In those situations, compensation is typically
determined by measuring the difference in the value of the burdened
landowner’s property before and after imposition of the easement.167
Amounts calculated through such an approach would at least roughly
approximate the value of the possessory use rights destroyed by the
restriction.
In the context of wind energy development, a compensation amount
determined under the “before and after” method just described would roughly
reflect the present value of the projected revenue stream that would have
accrued to the claimant under a wind energy lease on the restricted
property.168 For height restrictions in urban areas like those in Clark County,
Suntown, or Beachtown, the estimated profitability of potential development
within the restricted airspace would similarly be reflected in the
compensation amount.169
IV. BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES OF THE ADDITIONAL TAKINGS RULE
Like any article that proposes a significant change to regulatory takings
law, this Article would not be complete without a discussion of the likely
practical impacts of its proposed rule for veiled takings of airspace
easements. Takings laws ultimately influence the allocation of scarce

165. See, e.g., FRANCIS C. AMENDOLA ET AL., PROCEEDINGS TO CONDEMN PROPERTY AND TO ASSESS
COMPENSATION, 29A C.J.S. EMINENT DOMAIN § 351 (2011) (stating that, in eminent domain proceedings,
the “burden of showing the value of the taking or the damages which the landowner or condemnee will
suffer rests on the landowner”).
166. See, e.g., APPRAISAL INST., THE APPRAISAL OF REAL ESTATE 86 (12th ed. 2001) (noting that the
“value of an easement in and of itself is usually difficult to measure, primarily because easements are
rarely sold”).
167. JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 13.15[1] (3d ed. 2007).
168. The value of such a wind lease is dependent on numerous factors, including the potential
productivity of the wind above the subject property and the feasibility of developing a commercial wind
project on the site. See Troy A. Rule, A Downwind View of the Cathedral: Using Rule Four to Allocate
Wind Rights, 46 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 207, 208 n.1 (2009) (“Numerous factors, including average wind
speed, wind direction frequency, air temperature, the availability of adequate transmission facilities,
permitting issues, and ease of vehicular access can affect a property’s attractiveness for wind energy
development”) (citations omitted).
169. See, e.g., citation from note 57 at 5–6 (describing a lower court jury’s awarding of $13,000,000
in just compensation in connection with an airport height restriction based on evidence that the restriction
would prevent development of a “major casino/resort” on the burdened property, which an expert witness
testified was the “highest and best use” of the parcel).
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resources among governments and private citizens, so fine-tuning such laws
can have important impacts on society.170 If the Supreme Court were to adopt
the supplemental takings rule for veiled airspace easements outlined in Part
III above, or if Congress were to enact the rule, how might the new rule affect
the long-run productivity of the nation’s airspace? And what sorts of
unintended consequences could result from the rule?
Given the critical role that airspace plays in renewable energy and
sustainable development,171 clearer takings protections for airspace have the
potential to simultaneously strengthen private property rights and promote
sustainability. These dual benefits are particularly noteworthy, given that
property rights protection and environmentalism are often at odds in the land
use regulatory context.172 The following parts examine how the rule for
veiled takings of airspace easements advocated in this Article would increase
the overall productivity of the nation’s airspace and clarify an ambiguous
area of takings law. They also acknowledge and address some potential
criticisms of the rule.
A. More Efficient Use of Airspace
The supplemental takings rule proposed in this Article would not only
promote more equitable treatment of landowners vis-à-vis the government; it
would also encourage more efficient use of private airspace. By compelling
public entities to internalize more of the social cost of taking negative
airspace easements through regulation, the rule would discourage
governments from overregulating airspace solely to secure it for their own
use.
A simple equilibrium model is helpful in highlighting the efficiencypromoting benefits of the proposed rule.173 The model begins by
170. In the words of one scholar, courts “must decide takings cases by making explicit value choices
in the wide array of land use conflicts in which takings claims arise.” Mandelker, supra note 99, at 19.
171. The role of airspace in renewable energy and sustainable development is described in more detail
in the Author’s recent paper on private conflicts over airspace. See Rule, supra note 9, at 285–90.
172. Richard Lazarus has written about this tension between takings protections and environmental
protection on multiple occasions. See, e.g., Richard J. Lazarus, Celebrating Tahoe-Sierra, 33 ENVTL. L. 1,
25 (2003) (suggesting that the majority’s holding in Tahoe “reflects the competing concerns actually at
stake in reconciling the nation's need for sound environmental land use planning with its constitutional
commitment to the protection of private property rights.”); Richard J. Lazarus, Putting the Correct ‘Spin’
on Lucas, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1411, 1412 (1992) (stating that environmentalists feared “that a state or local
environmental protection agency would reduce its regulatory efforts if it thought that the Supreme Court
had dramatically increased the government's obligation to compensate owners of property subject to
environmental protection law[s]” after Lucas).
173. The model that follows in this part was first set forth in the author’s recent article examining
airspace use conflicts between private parties. See Rule, supra note 9, at 297–302.
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distinguishing rival airspace uses from non-rival uses. Many common
airspace uses are largely nonrival, meaning that they neither preclude nor
increase the cost of several other coincident uses of the same space.174 For
example, a single column of open airspace can simultaneously deliver
sunlight to a neighborhood’s gardens, skylights, and solar panels, preserve a
parcel’s territorial views, and carry electromagnetic signals at dozens of
different frequencies to satellite dishes, radio receivers, and cell phones.175
Multiple parties can concurrently enjoy all of these nonrival uses of the same
airspace without disrupting each other. In contrast, some airspace uses are
primarily rival, tending to interfere with or prevent other uses of the same
space. For instance, a landowner who grows a tree or erects a structure in
airspace imposes costs on neighbors by interfering with their views, sunlight
access, or other rival or nonrival uses of the space.176
Obviously, some airspace is most valuable to society as a place for rival
uses such as trees and buildings, while other airspace is more socially
valuable as an open space capable of serving various nonrival uses. Height
restrictions and other laws prohibiting rival airspace uses can promote the
social welfare by preserving certain airspace as a sort of “conservation
commons” for nonrival uses—a “commons whose most efficient use is
nonuse”177 in the physical sense.178 By optimally balancing rival and nonrival
airspace uses, airspace restrictions can maximize the productivity of the
airspace above a community. Framed more rigorously within microeconomic
theory: airspace restrictions in a given area are cost-justified up to some
equilibrium height at which the marginal social benefit of allowing rival use
of an additional inch of the space (MBr) equals the marginal social cost to
non-rival users of allowing the rival use within that inch of space (MCr).179
This equilibrium height is shown as H* in Figure A below.

174. Id. at 294–95.
175. Id. at 294.
176. Id. at 295.
177. Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Antiproperty, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1, 39
(2003).
178. As explained in the author’s previous article, by “nonuse,” Bell and Parchomovsky seemed to
have meant “only nonrival uses.” See Rule, supra note 9, at 296 n.124. Bell and Parchomovsky
emphasized several non-rival, non-invasive uses for a public park as examples of the benefits accruing to
neighbors from a conservation commons (the property owners abutting a public park benefited from using
the park as “a panoramic view, an acoustic barrier, and an air freshener”). See Bell & Parchomovsky,
supra note 177, at 4. They also referred to “conservation” as “non-building” in the context of a
conservation commons. Id. at 58.
179. For those interested in a full explanation of the model and its primary underlying assumptions,
see Rule, supra note 9.
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FIGURE A: OPTIMAL RESTRICTION HEIGHT180
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Public entities that impose veiled airspace easement regulations like those
described in Part II.A above abandon their pursuit of H* and instead calibrate
airspace restrictions based on their own resource needs. To illustrate the
inefficiency of such restrictions, reconsider the fictional city of Suntown
described in Part II.A.3.181 Suntown had planned to install solar panels on its
city hall and feared that future building construction in the area could
ultimately shade its panels. Assuming that the existing 120-foot height
restriction in the relevant area of Suntown was socially optimal, that
restriction height would corresponded to H* in Figure A. In contrast, securing
adequate solar access for Suntown’s panels required that construction heights
on blocks immediately south of the city hall be limited to just 60 feet, a level
corresponding to H1 in Figure A.
Suppose that the takings rule for veiled airspace easement regulations
proposed in Part III above had applied in Suntown. Under the rule, Suntown’s
only available means of preventing buildings from occupying the airspace
between H* and H1 would have been to acquire solar access easements from
neighbors through voluntary purchases or eminent domain. In either case,

180. The author initially introduced this general model in a previous article. See Rule, supra note 9, at
299.
181. See supra text accompanying note 67.
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Suntown would have had to pay amounts approximating fair market value to
obtain the easement rights. Assuming that Suntown’s officials acted
rationally on behalf of the city and were accurately informed, they would
have determined that the city’s cost of such easements exceeded the benefits
of protecting solar access on the roof of the city hall. Suntown thus would
have opted not to purchase the easements. Such a decision would have
produced the socially optimal outcome, permitting buildings to occupy the
space between H* and H1—a rival use for that airspace that was of greater
social value than the value of keeping the space open for solar access and
other nonrival uses.182
Of course, in the original Suntown example, the proposed takings rule did
not apply. Suntown was thus able to acquire solar access protection by
amending existing height restrictions to make H1 the new restriction height
on those parcels immediately south of the city hall that posed a shading risk.
These increased restrictions prohibited development within the airspace
between H* and H1, even though the marginal benefit of allowing
buildings—a rival use—within that space would have exceeded the marginal
costs that such development would have imposed on Suntown and other
nonrival users. By precluding socially optimal use of the airspace between H*
and H1, Suntown’s ordinance generated a deadweight loss represented by the
shaded area in Figure B below. This deadweight loss arose because the
potential development value of the airspace between H1 and H* exceeded the
aggregate value of Suntown’s solar access and of all other nonrival uses of
the space protected by the restriction.183 Such deadweight losses are a risk
under current regulatory takings laws, which provide no clear rule to compel
public entities like Suntown to weigh the social costs of veiled takings of
airspace easements.184

182. Of course, an assumption implicit in this conclusion is that, if Suntown were to seek solar access
easements through eminent domain, the court in the eminent domain proceeding would accurately valuate
the easement rights.
183. Indeed, solar access protection often may not be the highest valued use of given airspace since
solar resources tend to be of roughly the same quality almost anywhere within a city. To view national
solar resource maps, see Dynamic Maps, GIS Data, & Analysis Tools: Solar Maps, NAT’L RENEWABLE
ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/solar.html (last updated Oct. 23, 2012); see also Rule, supra note
7, at 861–62 (noting that “[a]lthough certain regions of the country have more solar resources than others,
the sunlight shining upon a rural field contains roughly as much energy as that shining on a downtown
office building or suburban home within the same geographic area”) (citations omitted).
184. A similar analysis would follow in connection with the veiled view easements described in the
Beachville scenario from Part II.A.4 supra. See supra text accompanying notes 68–70.
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FIGURE B: EFFECT OF A VEILED AIRSPACE EASEMENT REGULATION
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Similar deadweight losses can arise when the FAA restricts wind energy
development solely to prevent interference with the DOD’s radar systems.
The DOD is often the “cheapest cost avoider” in these disputes, capable of
preventing radar interference with wind turbines at a lower social cost than
the alternative approach of prohibiting the turbines.185 As mentioned above,
FAA restrictions aimed at protecting military radar systems have significantly
slowed valuable wind energy development in recent years, even though
relatively low-cost radar system upgrades are often available that could
prevent wind turbine conflicts.186 In many cases, the costs of such upgrades

185. Initially conceived by Guido Calabresi, the concept of a cheapest- or least- cost avoider has
become commonplace in law and economics literature. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A
LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 135 (1970); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 190 (7th ed. 2007) (stating that the “lower-cost accident avoider” should take precautions necessary
to avoid an accident); STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 17 (2007) (using the
term “least cost avoider”).
186. See, e.g., Vestel, supra note 46, at B4 (stating that “many radar systems in use in the United
States date back to the 1950s and have outdated processing capabilities—in some cases, less than those of
a modern laptop computer”); Elizabeth Burleson, Wind Power, National Security, and Sound Energy
Policy, 17 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 137, 143 (2009) (quoting the United States Department of Energy as
stating that “[t]here are a number of technical mitigation options available today, including software
upgrades to existing radar, processing filters related to signature identification, [and] replacing aging
radar”) (citation omitted); Larry Greenemeier, Wind Turbine or Airplane? New Radar Could Cut Through
the Signal Clutter, SCIENTIFIC AM. (Sept. 3, 2010), http://www.scientific american.com/article.cfm?id=
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are considerably lower than the potential social benefits of wind farm projects
that are abandoned or postponed due to the FAA’s restrictions.187 In the
context of these conflicts between wind energy development and the DOD,
the deadweight loss in Figure B reflects the positive difference between the
social benefits lost due to abandoned and delayed wind farm projects and the
cost of the military’s upgrading of its own radar equipment. By enabling the
federal government to hinder wind farm developments in private airspace at
little or no expense, current takings laws incentivize the government to
excessively obstruct these valuable projects.
Under the supplemental takings rule described in Part III above, such
deadweight losses would arise less frequently because the federal government
would be obligated to compensate landowners for restrictions of nonnavigable airspace aimed at preventing disruption of the DOD’s radar. The
rule would compel the DOD to either update its radar equipment or purchase
airspace easements from landowners sufficient to protect against interference
with wind turbines. Assuming that the DOD were acting rationally and with
perfect information under such a policy, the DOD would engage in a costbenefit analysis and ultimately elect to restrict wind energy development only
in cases where the cost of upgrading its radar exceeded the potential social
value of the wind farm at stake. This ability to incentivize governments to
internalize more of the social cost of veiled airspace easement regulations is a
primary benefit of the proposed takings rule.188
wind-farm-radar-clutter (stating that “[o]ne approach to the problem is upgrading radar systems . . . with
advanced digital signal processors so they can manage larger amounts of data and thereby identify and
filter out the signal scrambling caused by wind turbines”). Ironically, advanced radar systems that were
“built to order in the US” are enabling Great Britain to overcome its conflicts between wind farms and
military radar. Robert Mendick, Military Radar Deal Paves Way for More Wind Farms Across Britain,
THE TELEGRAPH (Aug. 27, 2011), http://www .telegraph.co.uk/earth/energy/windpower/8726922/Militaryradar-deal-paves-way-for-more-wind-farms-across-Britain.html.
187. Empirical studies of this issue have suggested that radar system replacement is often the most
cost-effective option. See, e.g., MICHAEL BRENNER ET AL., FED’N OF AM. SCIENTISTS, WIND FARMS AND
RADAR 8–9 (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/jason/wind.pdf (“The cost of a
single radar installation was said to be in the range of $3–8M, to be compared with the $2–4M cost of a
single wind turbine, and the roughly $0.5M annual electric production of a single turbine (5×10 6 kWh, at
$0.10/kWh retail). A wind farm can have hundreds of turbines”).
188. Requiring compensation when governments effectively take airspace easements can also increase
the aggregate social welfare by spreading the costs of public use of that space among all taxpayers rather
than a small number of landowners. This principle that cost sharing helps to maximize aggregate social
utility is known as “positive allocation theory.” At least one commentator has cited these cost-spreading
benefits in support of just compensation rules for takings of airspace easements. Robert F. Katz, Comment,
Airport Approach Zoning: Ad Coelum Rejuvenated, 12 UCLA L. REV. 1451, 1456–57 (1964) (applying
the cost spreading theories of Professor Guido Calebresi to support an argument that the social costs of
land use restrictions aimed at reserving airspace for airport uses are minimized if burdened landowners
receive just compensation) (citing Guido Calebresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of
Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 517 (1960)).
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B. Greater Clarity in Takings Law
In addition to promoting more efficient use of scarce airspace, the
supplemental takings rule described in Part III above would also provide
needed clarity to regulatory takings law as it relates to airspace. The greater
clarity afforded under the rule would reduce airspace development risk and
thereby encourage more investment in airspace-intensive land uses. Legal
scholars have long recognized that increasing citizens’ certainty that they will
be justly compensated for government takings leads to more optimal levels of
property development and investment.189 Like the Lucas and Loretto rules,
the proposed takings rule would reduce legal uncertainty for an additional
category of takings claims without materially impeding conventional land use
regulation.
C. Clearer Laws Regarding Airport Height Restrictions
A proposed rule for veiled takings of airspace easements would
significantly clarify takings laws as they relate to height restrictions near
airports. The strong disagreement among the justices in a recent Nevada
Supreme Court case exemplifies the current uncertainty plaguing this area of
the law. The claimant in McCarran International Airport v. Sisolak190 sought
just compensation from Clark County, Nevada, in connection with the
municipal height restrictions discussed in Part II.A.2 above that sought to
accommodate expansion of the Las Vegas airport.191 The newly restricted
airspace above portions of the claimant’s private property was not part of the
airport’s new runway flight path; it was merely within a “horizontal zone”
where planes might pass unintentionally during emergency situations.192
Nonetheless, the majority in Sisolak characterized the county’s ordinance
imposing height restrictions for this space as a per se physical taking and
analyzed it under Loretto.193 Even though planes only occasionally invade the

189. Frank I. Michelman included these negative impacts on investment within what he called the
“demoralization costs” associated with inadequate legal provisions for just compensation. Frank I.
Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of “Just
Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165, 1214 (1966) (stating that “demoralization costs” included
“the present capitalized dollar value of lost future production (reflecting either impaired incentives or
social unrest) caused by demoralization of uncompensated losers, their sympathizers, and other observers
disturbed by the thought that they themselves may be subjected to similar treatment on some other
occasion”).
190. 137 P.3d 1110 (Nev. 2006).
191. See supra text accompanying notes 58–61.
192. Sisolak, 137 P.3d at 1114–15.
193. Id. at 1125 (holding that county ordinances permitting planes to travel through the landowner’s
airspace within 500 feet of the surface “authorize[d] a physical invasion of [the claimant’s] property and
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burdened airspace, the majority seemed to take the view that the restrictions
compelled the claimant to forfeit possessory use of the space so that it could
serve a specific public use.194 Professor Andrea Peterson has suggested that
the Sisolak majority treated the Clark County ordinance as a physical taking
to avoid having to apply Penn Central.195 In Peterson’s view, the Sisolak
majority took that approach to “produce a fair outcome, even though the
categorization . . . was inaccurate.”196
Interestingly, the dissenting justices in Sisolak vigorously argued that
Loretto was not applicable in the case because the height restriction at issue
involved no authorized physical invasion of private airspace or express
transfer of airspace rights. One dissenting justice reasoned that “[a] regulation
that simply limits what a landowner can do with his or her property does not
amount to a taking under Loretto”197 and that the regulations challenged in
Sisolak did not, “on their face, establish any easement or other right to use a
landowner’s property.”198 Both dissenting justices determined that the facts of
the case required analysis under Penn Central’s multi-factor test.199
The Nevada Supreme Court’s struggle to address takings claims over
airport height restrictions is emblematic of a broader court split on these
questions that spans across several jurisdictions.200 Some courts have held
that compensation is due whenever a height restriction sets aside nonrequire[d] [the claimant] to acquiesce to a permanent physical invasion” and that the county had thereby
“effectuated a Loretto-type per se regulatory taking”).
194. Id. at 1124 (finding that the challenged ordinances “authorize[d] the permanent physical
invasion” of the claimant’s airspace because they “exclude[d] the owners from using their property and,
instead, allow[ed] aircraft to exclusively use the airspace”).
195. Peterson, supra note 92, at 426 (asserting that, “[b]y characterizing the ordinance as effecting a
physical taking, the court avoided analyzing the effect of the government’s action on the ‘parcel as a
whole,’ as Tahoe-Sierra requires in a regulatory takings case, and it avoided applying the Penn Central
test”) (citation omitted).
196. Id.
197. Sisolak, 137 P.3d at 1132 (Becker, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). This statement appears in
one of the case’s two dissenting opinions. The other dissenting justice took a similar view. Id. at 1135
(Maupin, J., dissenting) (concluding that the challenged ordinances had “not operated as a permanent
physical ouster” and that Loretto was therefore inapplicable in the case).
198. Id. at 1132–33.
199. Id. at 1131, 1134.
200. See Eagle, supra note 14, at 899–900 (citing numerous cases to show that that at least nine states
have held that an airport-driven height restriction results in a taking “at least under some circumstances”
and that “at least five have held that it does not”); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu, supra note
57, at 8 (arguing that “there is widespread, direct conflict among state courts on whether government
action that puts privately owned, buildable airspace near airports to public use is a physical taking that
requires compensation . . . .”); see also Major Walter S. King, The Fifth Amendment Takings Implications
of Air Force Aircraft Overflights and the Air Installation Compatible Use Zone Program, 43 A.F. L. REV.
197, 213 (1997) (stating that the “applicability of the per se takings tests remains an issue for flights below
500 feet”).
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navigable airspace for airport uses.201 However, several other courts have
proven reluctant to recognize airport zoning height restrictions as
compensable takings, even when there is evidence that aircraft sometimes
physically invade the restricted space.202 This inconsistent treatment of height
restrictions near airports creates uncertainty and investment risk that can lead
to suboptimally low levels of development of airspace. The proposed takings
rule would mitigate this uncertainty by providing a clearer and simpler means
for victims of such takings to obtain just compensation under the Takings
Clause.
D. Clearer Takings Rules for Wind Energy Development
The supplemental takings rule advocated in Part III above would also
spare parties in private-public disputes over airspace in the wind energy
context from having to litigate arcane state property law questions about the
severability of wind rights. Wind rights—property interests associated with
wind energy production—are increasingly listed alongside oil, gas and
mineral rights as valuable attributes of real property.203 Among other things,
wind rights typically include rights to occupy airspace above a parcel with
turbines capable of capturing the wind’s kinetic energy and converting it into
electric power.204
In recent years, growing interest in the concept of wind rights has given
rise to a new theory for challenging wind energy restrictions under the
Takings Clause. Takings claimants who argue under the Lucas test that a
government action has destroyed all economically viable use of a splintered
real property interest, such as a mineral estate, have a much greater chance of
201. See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu, supra note 57, at 9 n.5 (citing cases in California,
Indiana, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, Ohio, Idaho, and Washington in which a court
awarded just compensation to landowners in connection with zoning height restrictions).
202. See, e.g., Cnty. of Clark v. Hsu, 2004 WL 5046209 (Nev. 2004) (refusing to find that a per se
physical taking had occurred in connection with a height restriction imposed to create a “transition zone”
to the side of an airport runway); see also Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hsu, supra note 57, at 11 n.6
(describing cases in Florida, Kansas, Illinois, Iowa, and Wyoming in which courts declined to award just
compensation in connection with airport height restrictions).
203. See Nathaniel C. Giddings & Laurie Ristino, Proposal: A Uniform Act for Wind Rights, 8 ABA
ENERGY COMM. NEWSLETTER 1 (2011) (describing wind rights as having two parts: (i) “physical access”
to the surface estate to construct and maintain wind energy systems and (2) the “right to make use of the
wind that flows across the land and convert it . . . into electricity”).
204. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Wabaunsee Cty. (Zimmerman II), 264 P.3d.
989, 995 (Kan. 2011) (quoting language in instruments alleging to transfer wind rights as transferring,
among other things, the “exclusive and complete rights, titles, interests, and privileges in all the wind and
air above and passing through the land. . . .”). For a more detailed discussion of the role of airspace in
wind energy development, see Rule, supra note 9.
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success when the property interest at issue is “severed”205 from the fee
estate.206 Of course, Penn Central clearly established that airspace cannot be
conceptually severed from the fee for purposes of regulatory takings
analysis.207 On the other hand, some landowners in recent years have begun
severing wind rights and transferring them separately from surface
interests,208 and at least one court has upheld the validity of a severance of
wind rights from the underlying fee estate.209 Accordingly, one alternative
litigation strategy is to characterize a prohibition on wind energy
development as the taking of a severed wind estate.210
A regulatory takings argument based on the theory of severable wind
rights recently appeared in an amicus brief filed in Zimmerman, the case
described in Part III.B.2 above involving a county’s prohibition on wind
energy development.211 According to the brief, “[c]ase law . . . shows that

205. The act of separating mineral, oil, or gas rights from the fee simple interest in land by a deed or
other instrument is referred to as “severance” and is a well-established practice in real estate law. See 58
C.J.S. MINES AND MINERALS § 193 (2011) (stating that the “severance of the surface and mineral rights
may be accomplished either by a conveyance of the land with an express reservation or exception of the
mines and minerals, or by a conveyance of the minerals or mining rights, retaining the ownership of the
surface, or by an instrument conveying the surface rights to one person and the minerals and mineral rights
to another person, in severalty”) (citation omitted).
206. See, e.g., State ex rel. Shelly Materials, Inc., v. Clark Cnty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 875 N.E.2d 59, 67
(Ohio 2007) (stating that “[a] mineral estate may be considered the relevant parcel for a compensable
regulatory taking if the mineral estate was purchased separately from the other interests in the real
property”); Cane Tennessee, Inc. v. United States, 54 Fed. Cl. 100, 108 (Fed. Cl. 2002) (distinguishing
between severed and unsevered coal rights for purposes of regulatory takings analysis); Penn. Cent.
Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 127 (1978) (suggesting that the regulation at issue in
Mahon warranted the payment of just compensation because the regulation “had nearly the same effect as
the complete destruction of [all of the coal] rights claimant had reserved from owners of the surface land”).
207. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
208. For more information on this practice, see Christianson Hartman, Is the Wind Mine to Give
Away? Guidance for Testators Wishing to Transfer a Wind Interest, 1 EST. PLAN. & COMMUNITY PROP.
L.J. 399 (2008).
209. See generally Contra Costa Water Dist. v. Vaquero Farms, Inc., 58 Cal. App. 4th 883, 894 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1997) (holding that the “right to generate electricity from windmills harnessing the wind, and the
right to sell the power so generated, is no different, either in law or common sense, from the right to pump
and sell subsurface oil, or subsurface natural gas” and that therefore a landowner’s “wind rights” could be
legally severed from the surface estate).
210. For more information on the recent debate over the concept of a severable wind estate and related
legal issues, see Alan J. Alexander, The Texas Wind Estate: Wind as a Natural Resource and a Severable
Property Interest, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 429 (2010); see also K.K. DuVivier, Animal, Vegetable,
Mineral—Wind? The Severed Wind Power Rights Conundrum, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 69 (2009); Hartman,
supra note 208; Ernest E. Smith & Becky H. Diffen, Winds of Change: The Creation of Wind Law, 5 TEX.
J. OIL GAS & ENERGY L. 165, 176–81 (2009); Michael J. Stephan, Wind Severance, 40 TEX. ENVTL. L.J.
73 (2009).
211. See Brief of Amicus Curiae the Wind Coalition at 12, Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of
Wabaunsee Cty., 2009 WL 5244584 (No. 98487) (Kan. 2009) [hereinafter “Brief of Amicus Curiae”]. For
a detailed recital of the facts surrounding Zimmerman and the Kansas Supreme Court’s partial decision on
issues other than the takings claim, see Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Wabaunsee Cty.
(Zimmerman I), 218 P.3d 400 (Kan. 2009).
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where wind rights have been severed from the surface estate and are the only
property interest held . . . , the relevant parcel is the wind rights, not the
land.”212 The brief thus argued that, “[b]ecause the [c]ounty’s prohibition on
commercial wind energy systems eliminate[d] all economically beneficial
uses” of the wind developer’s wind leases, “a categorical taking proscribed
by Lucas [had] occurred.”213
The Zimmerman court ultimately dismissed the takings claim in that case,
concluding that the claimants held “no property for purposes of a takings
claim” because the county had not issued them conditional use permits for
commercial wind turbines so they held no legally vested property rights
capable of being taken.214 By framing its decision as a question of the vesting
of rights, the court avoided a takings analysis for wind rights.
However, the Zimmerman court’s approach left open an important
question: what if commercial wind turbines had previously been permitted
uses but the county subsequently prohibited them? Under those facts, the
court could not have used a vested rights argument to swiftly dispose of the
claimants’ takings claim. The court would have thus had to wrestle with the
question of whether the countywide prohibition on wind farms affected
compensable takings of the claimants’ “severed wind estates.”215 Given the
continued rapid pace of wind energy development,216 additional takings
arguments based on the idea of a severed wind estate are certainly plausible
in the future.217

212. Brief of Amicus Curiae, supra note 211, at 12.
213. Id.
214. Zimmerman v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs of Wabaunsee Cty. (Zimmerman II), 264 P.3d. 989, 1005
(Kan. 2011).
215. Id. at 998. One student commentator has suggested that a fear of having to compensate
landowners for future laws that destroyed wind rights was a possible reason for North and South Dakota
statutes expressly prohibiting the severance of a wind estate from the surface estate. See Nicholas R.
Hoffman, Note, A Don Quixote Tale of Modern Renewable Energy: Counties and Municipalities Fight to
Ban Commercial Wind Power Across the United States, 79 UMKC L. REV. 717, 732 (2010) (noting that
“fear of compensation from eminent domain and other ordinance and zoning issues” was a possible reason
for the “legislative discontent with wind energy severance”).
216. The blistering pace of wind energy development in recent years was referenced in Part II.A.1
above. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
217. For example, an attorney for a wind energy developer recently threatened to file a regulatory
takings claim if a proposed wind turbine moratorium in Idaho were put into law. See Mitch Coffman, Wind
turbine moratorium killed in House committee, IDAHOREPORTER.COM (Mar. 22, 2011), http://www.idaho
reporter.com/2011/wind-turbine-moratorium-killed-in-house-committee/ (quoting an attorney for a wind
energy developer as stating that if the state legislature’s proposed wind turbine moratorium “bill prohibits
the Idaho Wind Farm project from going forward, I don’t like to rattle my saber but I believe my clients
will have a powerful regulatory takings claim”). A provision in a recently enacted Wyoming statute also
preserves landowners’ rights to claim just compensation for government takings of wind rights even
though severing wind rights from the fee estate is no longer permitted in that state. See WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 34-27-105 (2011) (providing that “[n]othing in this act diminishes the right of the owner of the surface
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The new takings rule advocated in this Article could have easily resolved
the claim in Zimmerman, even if no vested rights argument had been
available for dismissing the claim. The Zimmerman claimants likely could
have satisfied the first element of the test, establishing that the ordinance
effectively deprived them of any possessory use of their airspace, because
wind energy development was the only financially viable physical use for the
airspace at issue.218 However, the claimants would have been unable to
satisfy the test’s second element because the county’s wind farm restrictions
were aimed at preserving the “scenic character of the [c]ounty,” not at
enhancing a public entity’s own resource position by facilitating government
exploitation of the restricted space.219 Without any discussion of the
severability of wind rights, the proposed takings rule would have clearly
identified the challenged ordinance as a valid, non-compensable police power
regulation of airspace.
E. Potential Criticisms of the Proposed Takings Rule
Like the Supreme Court’s existing takings rules, the rule for veiled takings
of airspace easements proposed in Part III would be far from perfect.220
However, the Court has proven willing to embrace takings rules that even the
Justices themselves have acknowledged have some shortcomings.221 The
following are some potential critiques of the rule and initial responses
suggesting that the rule’s potential benefits would outweigh any costs
resulting from its imperfections.

estate to receive compensation . . . for the taking of wind energy rights incidental to the exercise of
eminent domain”).
218. This assumption seems reasonable, given the highly rural and sparsely populated nature of the
county. See Zimmerman II, 264 P.3d. at 994 (noting that the county contains “approximately 800 square
miles and 7,000 people”).
219. The resolution accompanying the challenged Wabaunsee County ordinance justified the
prohibition on commercial wind energy upon a determination that such development “would be
incompatible with the rural, agricultural, and scenic character of the [c]ounty”). Id. at 997; see also Brief
of Amicus Curiae, supra note 211, at 933.
220. The Loretto, Lucas, and Penn Central rules have all suffered significant criticism over the years.
For a launching point into these critiques, see supra note 76, and supra notes 97–99 and accompanying
text.
221. For example, the Supreme Court recognized problems with the Lucas rule, which was also
intended to be a clear, bright-line rule but has plenty of ambiguity in its application. As described in Part
II.B.2 above, Justice Scalia acknowledged the shortcomings of the Lucas test when writing for the
majority in that case. See supra notes 97–99 and accompanying text. Legal commentators have likewise
noted the weakness of the Lucas rule. See, e.g., Penalver, supra note 76, at 229 (stating that “numerous
scholars have observed” that “the predictability created by Lucas is debatable, at least in part because of
the exceptions the Lucas Court wrote into its per se rule”) (citation omitted).
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1. A New Avenue for Frivolous Takings Claims?
One plausible criticism of the supplemental takings rule proposed in this
Article is that some citizens might file meritless takings claims that misapply
its government use standard and thereby impede legitimate government
activities.222 In their capacity as landowners, government entities routinely
enjoy views, sunlight, and other benefits of neighboring airspace kept open
by conventional land use controls along with the rest of a jurisdiction’s
landowners. Some claimants may try to argue that these incidental airspace
uses satisfy the proposed rule’s government use requirement.
Courts could deter most such abuses of the proposed rule by limiting the
scope of “government use” under the rule to exclude incidental uses. Jed
Rubenfeld aptly recognized the need to limit the meaning of “use” when
describing his “usings” test for regulatory takings.223 He advocated narrowing
the meaning of “government use” to encompass only cases where “some
productive attribute or capacity of private property is exploited for statedictated service.”224 Joseph Sax similarly argued that no compensation should
be due when the “government profit[s] only as an incidental beneficiary of a
rule enacted to resolve a controversy between private parties.”225 Exempting
incidental government uses of restricted airspace would reduce the likelihood
of frivolous claims under the proposed rule.
2. An Incentive to Excessively Restrict Airspace?
Another potential shortcoming of the proposed rule is that it could prompt
some public entities to overregulate airspace as a way to avoid takings
liability under the rule. Some public entities might determine that they can
better shield their veiled airspace easement regulations from takings
challenges under the rule by restricting a larger quantity of airspace than
necessary and then trying to characterize their airspace use as “incidental.”
222. This sort of critique resembles the “[g]overnment hardly could go on” line of argument that
Justice Holmes famously set forth in Mahon in the embryonic stages of regulatory takings law and
continues to be a significant consideration. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 290 U.S. 393, 413
(1922).
223. See Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1114 (providing an example of manipulation of “use” and
stating that if “the concept of use were hopelessly manipulable . . . then it would hardly be very useful”).
Joseph Sax saw similar challenges with his “government as an enterprise” distinction. See Sax, supra note
139, at 70–71 (conceding that “[t]he idea of a government enterprise is not a rigid and mechanical notion,
nor is it always crystal clear whether, if there is a government enterprise involved, it is being enriched by
the challenged regulation”).
224. Rubenfeld, supra note 76, at 1114–15.
225. See Sax, supra note 139, at 74.
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A revisiting of the Suntown fact pattern set forth in Part II.A.3 above
helps to illustrate this argument.226 Suppose that the proposed supplemental
takings rule had been adopted in Suntown’s jurisdiction and that Suntown
officials were well aware of the rule. Recognizing that a new height
restriction tailored only to protect solar access for its new solar panel array
would fit squarely within the rule, Suntown might opt to impose more severe
height restrictions on a large proportion of the city’s downtown area rather
than height restricting only the two blocks needed for the easement. By
restricting heights in this wider area and articulating some police power
justification for the new restriction in the public record that was unrelated to
the city’s solar panels, Suntown could potentially make its veiled taking less
vulnerable to challenges under the proposed rule.227 Unfortunately, the
practical effect of this sort of strategic overregulation would be the excessive
restriction of an even greater amount of the city’s airspace and even larger
deadweight losses.
For multiple reasons, this risk of strategic overregulation aimed at
avoiding takings liability seems negligible at best. For instance, such a
strategy is not even available to most federal entities because they lack
authority to impose generic land use restrictions on low-altitude airspace and
would thus have a difficult time disguising their restrictions as mere police
power regulations.228 Indeed, the FAA seems to openly acknowledge that its
restrictions on wind farms are not imposed to address land use conflicts
among private landowners but are instead aimed at preventing interference
with military radar.229 Expanding the geographic scope of the FAA’s wind
farm restrictions would therefore do nothing to disguise the government-asan-enterpriser motive behind such restrictions.
Even municipalities that can and already do exercise their police power to
restrict airspace would encounter practical limitations if they attempted to

226. See supra text accompanying note 67.
227. Municipalities have conventionally imposed height restrictions for a wide range of police power
purposes. See Peter W. Salsich, Jr., & Timothy J. Tryniecki, LAND USE REGULATION 174 (2d ed. 2003)
(delineating several common reasons for height restrictions, including the “regulation of overall
development density through limitations on building size, provision of open space, light, and air,” and
“preservation of rural character” of a community) (citations omitted).
228. Such police power authority is specifically reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. See Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1878) (noting that the police
power is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment); see also U.S. CONST. amend. X.
229. See Burleson, supra note 186, at 142–43 (describing FAA and DOD objections to wind turbines
and a “directive” issued by the DOD and Department of Homeland Security to contest “any establishment
of windmill farms within radar line of sight of the National Air Defense and Homeland Security Radars”)
(citing Cindy Skrzycki, A New Blip on Wind Power’s Radar Screen, WASH. POST, June 20, 2006, at D1,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/19/AR2006061901337
.html).
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strategically overregulate under the proposed rule. Such municipalities still
face political constraints because overregulating wider swaths of land only
increases the likelihood of landowner opposition and backlash.
Overregulating a broader area could also diminish property values for more
parcels and thereby weaken a greater proportion of the municipality’s local
property tax base.230 In summary, the theory that public entities might seek to
avoid takings liability by overly restricting excessive amounts of airspace
seems too attenuated to justify rejecting the proposed rule.
3. An Invitation for New Takings Claims Against Airports?
One other potential argument against the supplemental rule proposed in
this Article is that it could spur a new wave of claims for airspace easements
taken through existing airport height restrictions. Although some increase in
claims against airports could conceivably result under the rule, the
prescriptive easement doctrine and statutes of limitations would likely limit
their number. In cases where an airport has continually operated for several
years, a municipality could argue that it has a prescriptive avigation easement
as a defense to a takings claim.231 Particularly where there is evidence of
regular physical invasions of the airspace at issue, some courts have held that
avigation easements can be attained by prescription.232 Statutes of limitations
would also preclude many claims based on longstanding airspace restrictions
in the airport context.233
230. Protecting a community’s property values and hence its property tax base has long been a
common goal of local land use regulation. See, e.g., Symposium, Developments in the Law—Zoning: The
Legitimate Objectives of Zoning, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1443, 1457–58 (1978) (using case law and state
statutory laws to support the notion that a “municipality might zone to maintain or to increase the total
value of the property within its borders, presumably in order to limit the property tax burden on its
citizens” and that “[c]ourts generally hold that increasing the assessed value of property in a municipality
is a legitimate objective” of land use controls) (citations omitted).
231. See Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied 547 U.S. 1111
(2006) (holding that a prescriptive clearance easement existed because the airport had operated
continuously for at least 15 years and its use of the landowner’s airspace was adverse, open, and visible
during that period).
232. See 8A AM. JUR. 2D AVIATION § 8 (2009) (noting that “[t]here is a conflict of authority as to
whether an avigation easement may be obtained by prescription”). Eclavea and Arsdale identify three
cases in which courts did recognize prescriptive avigation easements. Id. (citing Ventres v. Goodspeed
Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937 (Conn. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1111 (2006); Christie v. Miller, 719 P.2d
68 (Or. App. 1986); Peterson v. Port of Seattle, 618 P.2d 67 (Wash. 1980)). They also cited two cases in
which courts refused to recognize such easements. See 8A Am. Jur. 2d Aviation § 8 (2009) (citing Cnty. of
Westchester, N.Y. v. Comm’r of Transp. of Conn., 9 F.3d 242 (2d Cir. 1993); Fiese v. Sitorius, 526
N.W.2d 86 (Neb. 1995)).
233. At least one case has applied a six year statute of limitations to preclude a takings claim for an
avigation easement against the United States Government, with the six-year period beginning to toll when
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In summary, the benefits from clarifying legal rights and promoting more
optimal use of airspace under the proposed takings rule seem to easily
outweigh the rule’s potential costs. The rule would facilitate simpler
adjudication of a subset of restrictions that are “functionally equivalent to the
classic taking”234 without unduly undermining governments’ ability to
regulate airspace in ways that promote the general welfare.235
CONCLUSION
Renewable energy and sustainable development are putting more airspace
to productive use than ever before. In this era of unprecedented competition
for scarce airspace, clearer laws are needed to prevent governments from
restricting airspace solely so that they can exploit it for their own purposes.
The lack of clear takings law protection against this practice has grown
increasingly problematic in recent years, hindering wind energy development
and triggering costly disputes near municipal airports. The continued growth
of solar energy and sustainable development is giving rise to even more
situations in which governments could be tempted to use their land use
regulatory authority to effectively take airspace rights.
The Supreme Court’s existing regulatory takings rules are inadequately
equipped to protect citizens against veiled takings of negative airspace
easements. The Court’s current takings jurisprudence relies heavily on
evidence of physical invasion of the claimant’s property or deprivation of all
economically viable use to identify compensable regulatory takings.
Regulatory takings of negative airspace easements often fall outside the scope
of these rules, creating an increasingly troublesome gap in takings law.
The Court could address this problem by supplementing its existing
regulatory takings rules with a new rule requiring just compensation for
government actions that effectively take airspace easements for use by public
entities. The rule could award just compensation upon a showing that the
challenged government activity (i) deprived the claimant of all possessory use
of private airspace and (ii) enhanced the resource position of some
government enterprise by enabling its exploitation of the restricted space.
This new takings rule could complement the existing categorical takings rules
under Lucas and Loretto, protecting against regulations that were functionally

aircraft began flying over the subject property. See generally Persyn v. United States, 106 F.3d 424 (Fed.
Cir. 1996).
234. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005).
235. As already described, Justice Holmes’s famous statement in Mahon that “[g]overnment hardly
could go on” embodies this general constraint on regulatory takings law. See supra note 222 and
accompanying text.
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equivalent to classic takings of negative airspace easements under eminent
domain.
As wind energy, solar energy, and sustainable development play an ever
larger role in land use, citizens and governments will increasingly be looking
to the sky for solutions. If properly tailored, a new takings rule reflecting the
unique attributes of airspace could add clarity to an ambiguous area of
takings law and promote more fair and efficient use of the nation’s precious
airspace in the decades to come.

